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1
2Abstract. We examine the classical/intuitionist divide, and how
it reflects on modern theories of infinitesimals. When leading in-
tuitionist Heyting announced that “the creation of non-standard
analysis is a standard model of important mathematical research”,
he was fully aware that he was breaking ranks with Brouwer. Was
Errett Bishop faithful to either Kronecker or Brouwer? Through
a comparative textual analysis of three of Bishop’s texts, we ana-
lyze the ideological and/or pedagogical nature of his objections to
infinitesimals a` la Robinson. Bishop’s famous “debasement” com-
ment at the 1974 Boston workshop, published as part of his Crisis
lecture, in reality was never uttered in front of an audience. We
compare the realist and the anti-realist intuitionist narratives, and
analyze the views of Dummett, Pourciau, Richman, Shapiro, and
Tennant. Variational principles are important physical applica-
tions, currently lacking a constructive framework. We examine the
case of the Hawking–Penrose singularity theorem, already analyzed
by Hellman in the context of the Quine-Putnam indispensability
thesis.
Re´sume´: Nous analysons le clivage classique/intuitionniste, et
la fac¸on dont il est refle´te´ dans les the´ories modernes des infiniment
petits. Losque l’intuitionniste Heyting annonc¸a que “la cre´ation
de l’analyse non-standard est un mode`le standard de recherche
mathe´matique importante”, il fut pleinement conscient du fait qu’il
rompait les rangs avec Brouwer. Errett Bishop fut-il fide`le soit a`
Kronecker soit a` Brouwer? Par le biais d’une e´tude comparative de
trois textes de Bishop, nous analysons la nature ide´ologique et/ou
pe´dagogique de ses objections aux infinite´simaux a` la Robinson.
La ce´le`bre remarque de Bishop concernant le “debasement”, au
colloque de Boston en 1974, et publie´e dans le cadre de son texte
La Crise etc., en re´alite´ ne fut jamais e´nonce´e devant un public.
Nous comparons les narratives realiste et anti-realiste intuition-
nistes, et analysons les opinions de Dummett, Pourciau, Richman,
Shapiro, et Tennant. Les principes variationnels constituent des
applications physiques importantes, et qui manquent actuellement
de cadre constructif. Nous examinons le cas des the´ore`mes sur
les singularite´s (de Hawking et Penrose), de´ja` analyse´ par Hellman
dans le contexte de la the`se de l’indispensabilite´ de Quine-Putnam.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Cognitive bias. The study of cognitive bias has its historical
roots in a classification proposed by Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626) of what
he called the idola (a Latin plural) of several kinds. He described these
as things which obstructed the path of correct scientific reasoning. Of
particular interest to us are his Idola fori (Illusions of the Marketplace):
due to confusions in the use of language and taking some words in
science to have a different meaning than their common usage; and Idola
theatri (Illusions of the Theater): the following of academic dogma and
not asking questions about the world (see Bacon [11]).
Completeness, continuity, continuum, Dedekind “gaps”: these are
terms whose common meaning is frequently conflated with their tech-
nical meaning. In our experience, explaining infinitesimal-enriched ex-
tensions of the reals to a professional mathematician typically elicits a
puzzled reaction of the following sort: “But how can you extend the
real numbers? Aren’t they already complete by virtue of having filled
in all the gaps already?” The academic dogma concerning the unique-
ness of the continuum defined necessarily as the complete Archimedean
ordered field in the context of ZFC has recently been challenged in the
pages of Intellectica, where numerous conceptions of the continuum
were presented, ranging from S. Feferman’s predicative conception of
the continuum [68] to J. Bell’s conception in terms of an intuitionistic
topos [17] following Lawvere [125].
To illustrate the variety of possible conceptions of the continuum,
note that traditionally, mathematicians have considered at least two
different types of continua. These are Archimedean continua, or A-
continua for short, and infinitesimal-enriched (Bernoulli) continua, or
B-continua for short. Neither an A-continuum nor a B-continuum cor-
responds to a unique mathematical structure (see Table 1.1). Thus, we
have at least two distinct implementations of an A-continuum:
• the real numbers in the context of classical logic (incorporating
the law of excluded middle);
• Brouwer’s real continuum built from “free-choice sequences”, in
the context of intuitionistic logic.
John L. Bell describes a distinction within the class of infinitesimal-
enriched B-continua, in the following terms. Historically, there were
two main approaches to such an enriched continuum, one by Leibniz,
and one by B. Nieuwentijdt. The latter favored nilpotent (nilsquare)
infinitesimals. J. Bell notes:
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Archimedean Bernoullian
classical Stevin’s
continuum3
Robinson’s
continuum1
intuitionistic Brouwer’s
continuum
Lawvere’s
continuum2
Table 1.1. Varieties of continua, mapped out according
to a pair of binary parameters: classical/intuitionistic and
Archimedean/Bernoullian.
Leibnizian infinitesimals (differentials) are realized in
[A. Robinson’s] nonstandard analysis,1 and nilsquare in-
finitesimals in [Lawvere’s] smooth infinitesimal analy-
sis [15, 16].
The latter theory relies on intuitionistic logic.2 A more recent imple-
mentation of an infinitesimal-enriched continuum has been developed
by P. Giordano, see [76, 77, 78], combining elements of both a classsical
and an intuitionistic continuum. The familiar real continuum is rooted
in the 16th century work of Simon Stevin.3
1.2. Birkhoff’s opposing schools. J. Dauben reports that Garrett
Birkhoff made the following statement at a Workshop on the evolution
of modern mathematics in 1974:
During the past twenty years, significant contributions
to the foundations of mathematics have been made by
two opposing schools [51, p. 132].
Birkhoff proceeded to identify the opposing schools as Abraham Robin-
son’s non-standard approach, and Errett Bishop’s constructive ap-
proach, which, according to Birkhoff,
attempts to reinterpret Brouwer’s “intuitionism” in terms
of concepts of ‘constructive analysis’.
S. Warschawski referred to non-standard analysis as
1More precisely, the Hewitt- Los´-Robinson continuum; see footnote 63.
2Lawvere’s infinitesimals rely on intuitionistic logic. Thus, Lawvere’s system
is incompatible with classical logic, see J. Bell [16]. The situation with Bishop’s
constructive mathematics is more complex; see Subsection 4.3.
3See A. Malet [130], J. Naets [136], Katz & Katz [113].
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a theory that has been described as diametrically op-
posed to constructivism [185, p. 37].
In 1999, a conference [158] sought to reunite the antipodes (another
term for our pair of opposing schools). D. Ross [155, p. 494] evokes a
conceptual gulf between the two approaches.
Robinson’s approach to infinitesimals has a coherent methodology
in the framework of the Zermelo-Fraenkel4 set theory with the axiom
of choice, in the context of classical logic (incorporating the law of
excluded middle).
The situation with intuitionism/constructivism is more nebulous.
Within this school, we will distinguish two significantly different ap-
proaches. One of the approaches can arguably be associated with
A. Heyting’s views [101, 102], as well as with Bishop’s views [25] as ex-
pressed in 1975. The other approach can be associated with Bishop’s
views [26] as expressed in 1977, as well as with M. Beeson [13] and
M. Dummett [60].5 A related dichotomy of liberal versus radical con-
structivism was analyzed by G. Hellman [95]. Rather than borrowing
terms from political science, we will exploit terms that are somewhat
more self-explanatory in a mathematical context, namely the view of
constructive mathematics as a companion versus an alternative to clas-
sical mathematics.
The infinitesimal, affectionately nicknamed the cholera bacillus of
mathematics by G. Cantor,6 has mutated into a bone of contention
between our pair of antipodes, a bone constricting the constructivist
throat of our students’ aspirations, according to some; and the elegant
answer to Leibniz’s dream,7 according to others.
The possibility of a peaceful coexistence between our pair of an-
tipodes is not an idle dream, but rather a matter of historical record.
In 1954, Robinson gave a lecture at a symposium on the “Mathemat-
ical interpretation of formal systems” chaired by A. Heyting, see [52,
p. 254]. In 1961, Robinson made public his new idea of non-standard
models for analysis, and “communicated this almost immediately to
A[.] Heyting” [52, p. 259]. Robinson’s first paper on the subject was
subsequently published in Proceedings of the Netherlands Royal Acad-
emy of Sciences [147]. An appreciation of Heyting’s work appears in
Robinson’s 1968 text:
4See footnote 36 on Fraenkel’s comments on infinitesimals.
5Dummett’s views will be examined in Section 6.3.
6See Meschkowski [133, p. 505] and Dauben [50, p. 353], [51, p. 124].
7 Note that Schubring [157, p. 170, 173, 187] attributes the first systematic use of
infinitesimals as a foundational concept, to Johann Bernoulli (rather than Leibniz).
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Among those who have shown a consistently construc-
tive attitude we may mention Heyting. . . . [149, p. 921].
In 1973, Heyting praised non-standard analysis as “a standard model
of important mathematical research” [102, p. 136].8
Meanwhile, S. Shapiro unveils an allegedly irreducible clash between
classical mathematics, on the one hand, and intuitionism as expressed
through Heyting’s semantics (see [160, p. 60]), on the other.9
From the viewpoint of classical mathematics, what is a reasonable
scope of the constructivist critique of the foundations? We will describe
the proposed dichotomy within constructivism, and argue that only
one of the approaches would be potentially amenable to a possible
reunification (or at least a state of non-belligerence) alluded to in the
title of the conference [158].
While commenting on the “role of non-standard analysis in mathe-
matics”, P. Halmos writes:
For some other[. . .mathematicians], who are against it
(for instance Errett Bishop), it’s an equally emotional
issue [89, p. 204].
What was it specifically about non-standard analysis, among other
fields of classical mathematics, that prompted Bishop’s opposition?
We will analyze this issue in Subsections 3.1 and 3.3.
Does intuitionism have an Achilles’ heel? Without attempting to
provide a definitive answer, we list potential vulnerabilities in Table 1.2,
arranged by field.
A recent analysis of the Classical vs Intuitionistic divide by D. West-
erst˚ahl posits that
The typical intuitionist takes truth to be what philoso-
phers call an epistemic notion: roughly, something is
true if it can be proved. [188, p. 177].
Such a summary would be agreed upon by many intuitionists. But
then Westerst˚ahl concludes:
This puts computation at center stage: (intuitionistic)
proofs are computations, or directions for finding com-
putations [188, p. 177].
Westerst˚ahl’s reformulation of constructively meaningful mathemat-
ics in terms of “computations” betrays an unmistakable influence of
8Heyting’s appreciation of Robinson’s theory is analyzed in more detail in Sub-
section 7.3.
9Shapiro’s views will be analyzed in Subsection 7.2.
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field issues discussed
in:
Mathematics Arguments in favor of coherence of
post-LEM numerical meaning
Section 5.2
Physics Variational principles, Hawking–
Penrose theorem, Hilbert’s Lagrangian
Section 8.4
Philosophy Diverging insurrectional narratives:
realist and anti-realist
Section 6.3
History Brouwer’s intellectual debt to Frege’s
revolution and Cantor’s revolution
Section 6.3
Defection Weyl, Heyting, Bridges arguably side
with a companion view
Sections 7.2,
7.3, 8, 6.5
Table 1.2. Radical Intuitionism: key issues
Bishop’s perspective, which tends to conflate meaning with compu-
tational meaning, as we will analyze below. Similarly, on the same
page it emerges that, to Westerst˚ahl (following Dummett), classical
mathematics means Platonism. No wonder that his evaluation of the
possibility of reaching a mutual understanding
is mostly negative: a basic asymmetry as to one side’s
ability to achieve understanding of what the other is up
to will remain [188, p. 177].
Meanwhile, our own assessment is mostly positive, relying on a more
nuanced presentation of both sides of what we hold to be a bridgeable
divide.
1.3. Where Weyl, Crowe, and Heyting agree. We conclude this
introduction by quoting Hermann Weyl:
It is pretty clear that our theory of the physical world is
not a description of the phenomena as we perceive them,
but [rather] is a bold symbolic construction. However,
one may be surprised to learn that even mathematics
shares this character [191, p. 553].
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No single formalism, whether classical or intuitionistic, represents
“a description of the [mathematical] phenomena”, to borrow Weyl’s
phrase. This sentiment is echoed by M. Crowe:10
creative mathematicians have repeatedly encountered
situations that are not resolvable by logic, that are no
less dependent on brilliance of mind and an ability to
see beyond logic, than those that have been faced by
physicists. One example would be the situation faced
by the pioneers of the calculus, who pushed forward de-
spite being surrounded by inconsistencies and counter-
intuitive deductions [44], [45, p. 316] [emphasis added–
authors].
In reference to classical mathematics, a similar thought is expressed
by the intuitionist Heyting, who described it as a “curious mixture of
formal reasoning and more or less vague intuitions”.
We analyze the sources of constructive aspirations in Kronecker’s vi-
sion in Subsection 2.1. In Subsection 2.2, we give a gentle introduction
to the intuitionistic challenge, following A. N. Kolmogorov. In Subsec-
tion 2.3, we give some examples of what it would mean to eliminate the
reliance on the law of excluded middle. In Subsection 2.4, we compare
Brouwerian and Bishopian mathematics.
In Subsection 3.1 we document some specific criticisms voiced by
Bishop. In Subsection 3.2, we examine the dual aspects of Halmos’s
relation to Robinson’s theory. In Subsection 3.3, we analyze the nature
of the challenge to Bishopian constructivism posed by a modern theory
of infinitesimals. The story behind Bishop’s “debasement” comment is
told in Subsection 3.4. Subsections 3.5 and 3.6 analyze the foundational
nature of Bishop’s criticisms.
The shifting ground of constructivist definitions is reviewed in Sec-
tion 4.1. The meaning of “finite” in the context of the Goodman-Myhill
theorem is reviewed in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 examines the finessing
of Brouwerian counterexamples in Bishopian constructivism.
A dichotomy of two distinct approaches within constructivism is pro-
posed in Subsection 5.1. Section 5.2 introduces a dichotomy of pre-
LEM and post-LEM numerical meaning. Subsection 5.3 examines a
philosophical outlook that can permit an intuitionist to accept both
types of meaning.
Section 6 deals with the fervor of Bishopian constructivism. Subsec-
tion 6.1 examines the views of B. Pourciau. A glossary of Bishopian
constructivism appears in Subsection 6.2, followed by an analysis of a
10See footnote 122.
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pair of insurrectional narratives in Subsections 6.3 and 6.4. Section 6.5
deals with the views of constructivist F. Richman.
Section 7 examines the issue of whether constructive mathematics
is part of classical mathematics. Subsection 7.1 examines the logical
developments, including Frege’s relational logic, in the 19th century
that created the conditions that made intuitionistic revolt possible.
We focus on Heyting’s intuitionism in Subsection 7.2, where we also
comment on the views of Shapiro and Tennant (the views of the latter
are also examined in Subsection 8.4). Heyting’s appreciation of non-
standard analysis is examined in Subsection 7.3.
Section 8 deals with a challenge to constructivism arising from nat-
ural science. Subsection 8.1 deals with Bishop’s own view of the appli-
cability of mathematics in the natural sciences. Section 8.2 deals with
G. Hellman’s indispensability thesis approach. S.P. Novikov’s perspec-
tive is discussed in Subsection 8.3. The Hawking–Penrose theorem and
its foundational ramifications are analyzed in Subsection 8.4.
2. A crash course in intuitionism
We present some preliminary remarks on the intuitionist project from
Kronecker to Brouwer and beyond. More technical aspects of construc-
tivism are dealt with in Section 4.
2.1. The genesis of the constructive project in Kronecker. While
constructivist aspirations can be detected already in a predilection for
the rationals (at the expense of broader number systems) on the part
of mathematicians both ancient and modern, the roots of 20th century
constructivism are surely to be sought in L. Kronecker. J. Boniface
and N. Schappacher recently edited an important unpublished essay of
Kronecker’s. Here Kronecker envisions a 3-part subdivision of mathe-
matics as follows:
la me´canique, qui ope`re avec la notion de temps, la
ge´ome´trie, qui e´tudie les relations spatiales inde´pendantes
du temps, et la mathe´matique dite pure, dans laquelle
n’interviennent ni le temps ni l’espace, et que je veux
appeler ‘arithme´tique’11 [30, p. 211].
Thus, mathematics is subdivided by Kronecker into mechanics (which
apparently corresponds to mathematical physics), geometry, and arith-
metic. Kronecker proceeds to state the scope of his constructivist
project of the reduction of mathematics to the integers, in the following
terms:
11These comments appear on pp. 10–11 in Kronecker’s manuscript.
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Il souligne (p. 15) que “tout ce qui n’appartient pas a` la
me´canique et a` la ge´ome´trie, et que je veux rassembler
sous l’intitule´ d’arithme´tique, devrait eˆtre effectivement
arithme´tise´” [30, p. 211].
Thus, the only branch of mathematics that is to be arithmetized (i.e.,
converted into a discourse about the natural numbers), according to
Kronecker, is that which falls outside the domain of both geometry and
mathematical physics. The implication is that geometry need not, or
could not, be so arithmetized, in Kronecker’s opinion. Kronecker pro-
vides a reasonable limitation to the scope of his constructivist project.
Boniface and Schappacher further note:
‘Arithme´tiser’ consiste, pour Kronecker, non seulement
a` re´duire les objets mathe´matiques aux entiers positifs,
mais aussi a` n’utiliser que des me´thodes arithme´tiques
[30, p. 211] . . . Les concepts de nombre ne´gatif et de
nombre fractionnaire e´tant e´vite´s en tant que concepts
fondamentaux de l’arithme´tique, celui de nombre irra-
tionnel le sera a fortiori. L’irrationalite´ est un concept
ge´ome´trique et doit, selon Kronecker, rester dans le do-
maine ge´ome´trique [30, p. 213].
In short, geometry (including irrational numbers) falls outside the scope
of Kronecker’s constructivist project. In his moderation of scope, Kro-
necker was not followed by all of his would-be disciples.
2.2. Kolmogorov on paradoxes. Eighty years ago, A. Kolmogorov
described the emergence of both Hilbert’s formalism and Brouwer’s
intuitionism, as
a reaction against the set-theoretic conception of math-
ematics [121, p. 380].
Kolmogorov speaks of great difficulties and even contradictions (ibid.
p. 382) caused by set-theoretic mathematics , citing Russell’s paradox as
an example (ibid. p. 383). As to Zermelo’s axiom of choice, he writes:
it came to a hopeless collision with the idea that math-
ematic[al] existence should be based on a[n appropriate]
construction [. . . ] objects whose existence is postulated
by this axiom appeared to be not only useless but some-
times destructive to the simplicity and [rigorousness] of
crucial mathematical theories.
The recent republication [121] of Kolmogorov’s text was annotated by
V. Uspenskiy. In his note 15 on page 387, Uspenskiy illustrates the
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above comment in terms of the famous Banach-Tarski paradox (see
[183]).
In short, a significant mathematical minority has felt that the para-
doxes of set theory have sapped the faith in both set-theoretic founda-
tions and classical logic.
How is one to view the classical axiom of choice and its counterin-
tuitive consequences such as the Banach-Tarski paradox? There could
be at least two distinct approaches:
(1) one can maintain that “infinite sets behave differently from fi-
nite sets” (and in particular have properties that appear to be
paradoxical when compared to finite sets); alternatively,
(2) some of the basic assumptions of set-theoric foundations and
classical logic need to be re-examined.
A classically trained mathematician typically follows the first ap-
proach. Meanwhile, an intuitionist would follow the second approach,
and would ask the classical mathematician: “Certainly, infinite sets
behave differently from finite sets. But can you exhibit a single such
paradoxical infinite ‘set’ explicitly? The only way of accessing such
‘sets’ is by invoking the classical axiom of choice and the law of ex-
cluded middle. Since such ‘sets’ tend to contradict our intuition of
physical space, the reasonable alternative is to reject both the ‘sets’
themselves, and whatever dubious axioms and procedures are respon-
sible for propelling them into existence in the first place.”12
The procedures in question are detailed in the next section.
2.3. Law of excluded middle and constructive quantifiers. A
gentle introduction to intuitionism would necessarily seek to clarify
the law of excluded middle by providing suitable examples (see below).
The meta-mathematical language of mainstream mathematics relies
on what is generally referred to as classical logic, which we will briefly
denote
ClLo,
incorporating the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). The law of excluded
middle is the key ingredient in a proof by contradiction, as Example 2.1
below illustrates. H. Billinge writes that E. Bishop
seems to take it that common sense would balk at allow-
ing the assertion of ‘there exists an x such that P (x)’
on the flimsy basis of having shown that a contradiction
12All constructivists reject the sets involved in paradoxical decompositions a` la
Banach-Tarski. Infinite sets (actual infinity) are acceptable to Bishop’s followers,
see footnote 24, but not to Dummett’s followers, see footnote 104.
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can be derived from assuming that there is no x such
that [. . . ] P (x) [21, p. 184].
She concludes that
the only reason that we ordinarily accept such a deriva-
tion as evidence for such an existence claim must be that
we take it that we are dealing with a finite domain and
hence that we would be able to find the x in question
by examination [i.e., “by inspection”].13
We will illustrate the difference between the classical and the construc-
tive approach by means of some typical examples.
Example 2.1. Irrationality of x is defined constructively in terms of
concrete separation between x and each rational m
n
(separation being
expressed in terms of the denominator n). The classical proof of the
irrationality of
√
2 is a proof by contradiction. Namely, we assume a
hypothesized equality
√
2 = m
n
, square both sides, examine the par-
ity of the powers of 2, and arrive at a contradiction. At this stage,
irrationality is considered to have been proved, in ClLo.14
Alternative, numerically meaningful (see glossary in Subsection 6.2),
arguments for irrationality exist. Thus, without exploiting the hypo-
thetical equality
√
2 = m
n
, one can exhibit positive lower bounds for the
13Of course, no computer can examine, or inspect, a collection containing,
say, 10100 elements. Billinge’s comments should not be interpreted as an endorse-
ment of a strict finitism (certainly not espoused by Bishop), but rather as a way
of introducing an intuitionistic viewpoint to a classical reader unfamiliar with this
circle of ideas.
14The classical proof that
√
2 is not rational is acceptable in intuitionistic logic.
To pass from this to the claim of its irrationality as defined above, requires LEM,
or more precisely the law of trichotomy: (x < 0) ∨ (x = 0) ∨ (x > 0) (see Sub-
section 4.3 for more details on the latter). Our purpose here is not to present an
exhaustive treament of the intuitionistic perspective on irrationality, but rather to
give an accessible illustration of what might be considered a numerically meaningful
argument, as opposed to an indirect proof (by contradiction).
14 KARIN USADI KATZ AND M. KATZ
difference |√2− m
n
| in terms of the denominator n, resulting in a con-
structively adequate proof of irrationality.15 A more detailed discussion
of this example, by E. Bishop, may be found at [27, p. 18].
Brouwer’s intuitionism, as well as most forms of constructivism, rely
on intuitionistic logic, which we will briefly denote
InLo,
characterized by the rejection of LEM. The relation can be represented
graphically as follows:16
ClLo− LEM ≈ InLo. (2.1)
Similarly, constructive quantifiers are different from the classical ones,
in that their domain of discourse is reduced to constructive entities.17
Constructivism adopts a verificational interpretation of the quantifiers.
In this context, it is relevant to mention that the (sub)finite axiom of
choice would imply LEM, see Section 4.2. To emphasize the distinction
between two types of quantifiers, one could incorporate a mention of
ClLo (respectively, InLo) as part of the quantifier notation, as the
following example illustrates.
Example 2.2. Consider the following special case of the axiom of
choice. Let 2R be the set of sets of reals, and 22
R
, the set of sets of sets
of reals. Let
22
R
∐
15For each rational m/n, the integer 2n2 is divisible by an odd power of 2,
while m2 is divisible by an even power of 2. Hence |2n2 −m2| ≥ 1 (here we have
applied LEM to an effectively decidable predicate over Z, or more precisely the law
of trichotomy). Since the decimal expansion of
√
2 starts with 1.41 . . ., we may
assume m
n
≤ 1.5. It follows that
|
√
2− m
n
| = |2n
2 −m2|
n2
(√
2 + m
n
) ≥ 1
n2
(√
2 + m
n
) ≥ 1
3n2
,
yielding a numerically meaningful proof of irrationality.
16The approximate equality sign “≈” reflects the fact that there are many subsys-
tems of classical logic which, when LEM is adjoined to them, yield all of classical
logic. Thus, intuitionistic logic is not uniquely characterized by the rejection of
LEM. Still, such a rejection is the main theme of intuitionism (see Bishop’s com-
ment on the axiom of choice in Subsection 4.2). While it may have been more
correct to write InLo + LEM = ClLo, we chose to emphasize the passage from
classical logic to intuitionistic logic, rather than vice versa, keeping in mind the
dominant modes of logical reasoning of the mathematical public today.
17We are mostly following Bishop’s views here; for a discussion of Richman’s
views, see Subsections 6.5 and 8.1.
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be the set of sets of mutually disjoint, non-empty sets of reals. In this
case, the classical axiom of choice asserts that(
∀ClLoA ∈ 22
R
∐
) (∃ClLoS ∈ 2R) (∀ClLox ∈ A) |x ∩ S| = 1.
In the case of a finite set, say
{0, 1},
the corresponding formula(
∀ClLoA ∈ 22
{0,1}
∐
) (∃ClLoS ∈ 2{0,1}) (∀ClLox ∈ A) |x ∩ S| = 1 (2.2)
can be proved by induction. Moreover, by the Goodman-Myhill theo-
rem (see Section 4.2), formula (2.2) implies LEM.18
An intuitionistic version is obtained by replacing the subscript ClLo
by InLo (see (2.1)) on all quantifiers:19(
∀InLoA ∈ 22
{0,1}
∐
) (∃InLo S ∈ 2{0,1}) (∀InLo x ∈ A) |x ∩ S| = 1 (2.3)
Formula (2.3) applies to constructively finite sets but not to subfinite
sets.20 Namely, the domain of the quantifiers is limited to construc-
tively defined sets only. In particular, (2.3) does not prove LEM, and
is constructively acceptable.21
The intuitionistic way of thinking represents a major paradigm shift.
Many classically-trained mathematicians find it difficult to appreciate
either its utility or the well-foundedness of its trademark distrust of
proofs by contradiction. Hopefully the examples provided in this sec-
tion provide a start for such an appreciation.
The following argument is apparently well-known in constructive cir-
cles.22 It concerns the claim of the consistency of the foundations of
mathematics. The argument in favor of the claim is indirect, relying on
a proof by contradiction. It is surprisingly short, and goes as follows.
Consider the claim that the foundations of mathematics are consistent.
Suppose not. Then there is an inconsistency in the foundations. We
get a contradiction, proving the claim.23 
18See footnote 74 for a detailed discussion of this implication.
19When switching to intuitionistic quantifiers, it is customary to replace “non-
empty sets” by “inhabited sets”, so as to avoid a linguistic excluded-third pitfall,
see footnote 74.
20Subfinite sets are discussed in more detail in Subsection 4.2.
21Concerning the infinite constructive axiom of choice, see Bishop’s remark in
Subsection 4.2.
22Communicated by Gabriel Stolzenberg.
23At this point the classical mathematician typically bursts out laughing at the
proof, while the constructivist may perhaps smile at the classical mathematician.
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2.4. Bishop and Brouwerian countexamples. E. Bishop was a
leading representative of the tendency described as intuitionist or con-
structivist.24 Among a variety of intuitionistic schools, Bishopian con-
structivism has been one of the most influential, both mathematically
and philosophically. Bishop’s perspective on the Classical/Intuitionistic
divide has influenced even would-be “outside” observers. Thus, West-
erst˚ahl claims that
[Bishop’s] aim was to do constructive mathematics that
looked just like ordinary mathematics, not even appar-
ently contradicting any classical theorems [188, p. 185].
However, Brouwerian counterexamples do appear in Bishop’s work.
This could not be otherwise, since a verificational interpretation of the
quantifiers necessarily results in a clash with classical mathematics. As
a matter of presentation, the conflict with classical mathematics had
been de-emphasized by Bishop. Bishop finesses the issue of Brouwer’s
theorems (e.g., that every function is continuous) by declaring that he
will only deal with uniformly continuous functions to begin with. In
Bishopian mathematics, a circle cannot be decomposed into a pair of
antipodal sets. A real number a satisfying ¬((a ≤ 0) ∨ (a ≥ 0)) yields
a counterexample to the extreme value theorem.25
3. A kinder, gentler constructivism
In Section 2.4, we discussed Bishop’s mathematical and philosophical
influence. Bishop put such influence to a variety of uses.
3.1. The debasement and obfuscation charges. Bishop’s Crisis26
essay [25] is cast in the form of an imaginary dialog between Brouwer
and Hilbert. Bishop narrates a creation story of intuitionism in the
form of such an imaginary dialog, where Brouwer completely dominates
the exchange. Indeed, Bishop’s imaginary Brouwer-Hilbert exchange
is dominated by an unspoken assumption that Brouwer is the only one
who seeks “meaning”, an assumption that his illustrious opponent is
never given a chance to challenge.
Hopefully we have succeeded in conveying to our gentle reader, a sense of a con-
structivist reception of a typical proof by contradiction.
24It should be kept in mind, however, that Bishop rejects both Kronecker’s
finitism (as Bishop freely exploits the actual infinity of the natural numbers) and
Brouwer’s theory of the continuum, see main text at footnote 60.
25A more detailed discussion may be found in Subsection 4.3.
26Apparently a take-off on H. Weyl’s own Crisis text [189], see also end of
Section 8.
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Meanwhile, Hilbert’s comments in 1919 reveal clearly his attachment
to meaning which he refers to as internal necessity :
We are not speaking here of arbitrariness in any sense.
Mathematics is not like a game whose tasks are deter-
mined by arbitrarily stipulated rules. Rather, it is a
conceptual system possessing internal necessity that can
only be so and by no means otherwise [104, p. 14].27
Bishop expressed his views about Robinson’s infinitesimals and their
use in teaching in a brief paragraph toward the end of his text. Follow-
ing his discussion of Hilbert’s formalist program, Bishop inserted the
following text:
A more recent attempt at mathematics by formal finesse
is non-standard analysis. I gather that it has met with
some degree of success, whether at the expense of giving
significantly less meaningful proofs I do not know. My
interest in non-standard analysis is that attempts are
being made to introduce it into calculus courses. It is
difficult to believe that debasement of meaning could
be carried so far28 [25, p. 513-514] [emphasis added–
authors].
Bishop’s view of the introduction of Robinson-style infinitesimals in
the classroom as no less than a debasement of meaning (see glossary in
Subsection 6.2), was duly noted by J. Dauben.29 Bishop’s sentiments
toward calculus based on Robinson-style infinitesimals stand in sharp
contrast with those of his fellow intuitionist A. Heyting, who felt that
[Robinson] connected [an] extremely abstract part of
model theory with a theory apparently so far apart as
the elementary calculus. In doing so [he] threw new light
on the history of the calculus by giving a clear sense to
Leibniz’s30 notion of infinitesimals [102, p. 136].
Heyting’s views are analyzed in more detail in Subsections 7.2 and 7.3.
27Cited in Corry [43]. See also footnote 55.
28The story behind the insertion of this paragraph is told in Subsection 3.4.
29See [49, 51]. While there was apparently a wave of reactions to Bishop’s
review at the time, surprisingly little of it has made its way into print. Other
than Dauben’s essays already mentioned, there is Keisler’s own brief measured
response [115], followed in the same issue of the Notices by some comments by
V. Komkov [122], see footnote 49. Komkov’s letter was mentioned in a Math-
SciNet review by P. Smith [162]. Bishop’s review was also examined briefly by
M. Davis [55], see footnote 34.
30But see footnote 7 for a historical clarification by Schubring.
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Bishop anchors his foundational stance in a species of mathematical
constructivism in the following terms:
To my mind, it is a major defect of our profession that
we refuse to distinguish [. . . ] between integers that are
computable and those that are not [. . . ] the distinc-
tion between computable and non-computable, or con-
structive and non-constructive is the source of the most
famous disputes in the philosophy of mathematics [25,
pp. 507-508].
On page 511, Bishop defines a limited principle of omniscience (LPO)
as the supposition that
it is possible to search “a sequence of integers to see
whether they all vanish”,
and goes on to characterize the dependence on the LPO as a procedure
both Brouwer and Bishop himself reject.31 The search for numerical
meaning is a goal that can appeal to any mainstream mathematician.
This thread will be pursued further in Subsection 5.1.
S. Feferman [66, end of section A of part I] identifies LPO as a special
case of the law of excluded middle, see Section 2.3 above.
Given that a typical construction of Robinson’s infinitesimals (see
Keisler [116, p. 911]) certainly does rely on LPO (but see [139]), Bishop’s
opposition to such infinitesimals, expressed in a vitriolic32 review of
Keisler’s textbook, may have been expected. Indeed, Bishop wrote:
The technical complications introduced by Keisler’s ap-
proach are of minor importance. The real damage lies
in [Keisler’s] obfuscation and devitalization of those
wonderful ideas [of standard calculus]. No invocation
of Newton and Leibniz is going to justify developing
calculus using axioms V* and VI*-on the grounds that
31S. Feferman explains Bishop’s principle as follows: “Bishop criticized both non-
constructive classical mathematics and intuitionism. He called non-constructive
mathematics ‘a scandal’, particularly because of its ‘deficiency in numerical
meaning’. What he simply meant was that if you say something exists you ought
to be able to produce it, and if you say there is a function which does something
on the natural numbers then you ought to be able to produce a machine which
calculates it out at each number” [66] [emphasis added–authors].
32Historians of mathematics have noted the vitriolic nature of Bishop’s remarks,
see e.g., Dauben [51, p. 139], cf. footnotes 38, 75, and 43. M. Artigue [6, p. 172]
described it as “virulent”; Davis and Hauser [56], as “hostile”; D. Tall [174], as
“extreme”.
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the usual definition of a limit is too complicated!33 [26,
p. 208] [emphasis added–authors].
M. Davis notes that Bishop fails to acknowledge explicitly in his re-
view in the Bulletin that his criticism is motivated by his foundational
preoccupation with the law of excluded middle.34
A similar point is alluded to in Keisler’s brief (and measured) re-
sponse:
why did Paul Halmos, the Bulletin book review editor,
choose a constructivist as the reviewer? [115, p. 269]
Keisler traced the source of Bishop’s criticism, to the constructivist crit-
icism of classical mathematics, more specifically of its reliance on clas-
sical logic, incorporating the key item rejected by intuitionists, namely
the law of excluded middle. Comparing the use of the latter to wine,
Keisler compares Halmos’ choice of reviewer, to “choosing a teetotaller
to sample wine”. Halmos’ reply will be analyzed in Subsection 3.2.
In short, the constructivist Bishop is criticizing apples for not be-
ing oranges: the critic and the criticized are not operating in a com-
mon foundational framework.35 The foundational framework of non-
standard analysis, namely the Zermelo-Fraenkel36 set theory with the
axiom of choice (ZFC), is the framework of the vast majority of the
readers of the Bulletin, at variance with Bishop’s preferred intuitionistic
framework. From the vantage point of the latter, Bishop’s debasement
33Bishop is referring to the extension principle and the transfer principle of non-
standard analysis. See Subsection 3.5.
34M. Davis writes as follows: “Keisler’s book is an attempt to bring back the
intuitively suggestive Leibnizian methods (but see footnote 7) that dominated the
teaching of calculus until comparatively recently, and which have never been dis-
carded in parts of applied mathematics. A reader of Errett Bishop’s review of
Keisler’s book would hardly imagine that this is what Keisler was trying to do,
since the review discusses neither Keisler’s objectives nor the extent to which his
book realizes them. Bishop[, meanwhile,] objects to Keisler’s description of the
real numbers as a convenient fiction (without informing his readers of the con-
structivist context in which this objection is presumably to be understood)” [55,
p. 1008] [emphasis added–authors]. See further Subsection 3.5.
35A similar point was mentioned by M. Davis [55], see footnote 34.
36It is interesting to note a criterion of success of a theory of infinitesimals as
proposed by Adolf Abraham Fraenkel and, before him, by Felix Klein. In 1908,
Klein formulated a criterion of what it would take for a theory of infinitesimals
to be successful. Namely, one must be able to prove a mean value theorem for
arbitrary intervals, including infinitesimal ones [119, p. 219]. In 1928, A. Fraenkel
[70, pp. 116-117] formulated a similar requirement in terms of the mean value
theorem. Such a Klein-Fraenkel criterion is satisfied by the Hewitt- Los´-Robinson
theory by the transfer principle, see Appendix A.
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of meaning and obfuscation charges would apply equally well to most
of classical mathematics, a point alluded to in Feferman’s comment
cited above.37 Perhaps one may be permitted to detect a deficiency
in the attributes mentioned in the title of our current Section 3, when
analyzing Bishop’s published remarks concerning Robinson’s approach.
3.2. Halmos’s translation. An interesting exchange took place in
the pages of the Bulletin and theNotices . Keisler’s response to Bishop’s
review of his book was discussed in Subsection 3.1. Halmos’ reply38 to
Keisler’s question came in the form of an editorial pointer on p. 271 of
the same issue, referring the reader to Halmos’ outline of his editorial
philosophy on p. 283:
As for judgments, the reviewer may [. . . ] say (or imply)
what he thinks.
Halmos’s philosophy was that a reviewer may legitimately use the re-
view of a book as a springboard for developing his own ideological
agenda.
According to a close associate [63] of Halmos’, Halmos’ policy was
to confront opposing philosophies in the goal of livening up the debate.
One of his goals was to boost lagging sales that were plaguing the
publisher at the time, see [89]. The bottom-line issue, combined with
Halmos’ own unflattering opinion of non-standard analysis as “a special
tool, too special” [89, p. 204], apparently made the choice of Halmos’
student (Bishop) as the reviewer, attractive to the editor.
In the case of Keisler’s book, such editorial philosophy translated
into a review, by Bishop, whose thinly disguised foundational agenda
(an attempt to de-legitimize the use of the law of excluded middle in
mathematical practice) took the form of vitriolic criticism of Robinson-
style infinitesimal calculus.
In his autobiography, Halmos described non-standard analysis as a
special tool, too special [89, p. 204]. In fact, his anxiousness to evaluate
Robinson’s theory may have involved a conflict of interests. In the early
1960s, Bernstein and Robinson [19] developed a non-standard proof of
an important case of the invariant subspace conjecture of Halmos’. In
a race against time, Halmos produced a “standard translation” of the
37See footnote 31 for Feferman’s comment.
38An additional reply to Keisler’s query, by G. Stolzenberg [166] (a close associate
of Bishop’s), occupies slightly over a column on page 242 of the Notices. Given its
author’s interest [167] in literary deconstruction, we note that the reply manages to
employ a root, dogma (conspicuously absent from Keisler’s letter), on five occasions,
culminating in the expression the spouting of dogma in the penultimate paragraph,
cf. footnotes 32 and 75.
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Bernstein-Robinson argument, in time for the translation [90] to ap-
pear in the same issue of Pacific Journal of Mathematics , alongside the
original. Halmos invested considerable emotional energy (and “sweat”,
as he memorably puts it in his autobiography [89]) into his translation.
Whether or not he was capable of subsequently maintaining enough
of a detached distance in order to formulate an unbiased evaluation
of non-standard analysis, his blunt unflattering comments may create
an impression of impropriety, as if he were retroactively justifying his
translationist attempt to deflect the impact of one of the first spectac-
ular applications of Robinson’s theory.
3.3. Why was non-standard analysis the target? We saw that
Bishop’s debasement charge applies to all of classical mathematics.39
What was it specifically about non-standard analysis, among other
fields of classical mathematics, that may have prompted E. Bishop
to speak out against it specifically? We argue in Subsection 3.5 that
Bishop’s comments on non-standard analysis in [25] and [26] need to be
understood in the context of his foundational writings that appeared
elsewhere, as neither his motivation, not his terminology, are explained
in [25] and [26].
We will first mention three possible technical reasons for Bishop’s
choice of target, and then discuss a possible philosophical reason. The
possible technical reasons as the following:
(1) Certain results of classical analysis can be convincingly adjusted
to increase their numerical content, by strengthening their hy-
potheses and/or weakening the conclusions (cf. Subsection 4.1);
meanwhile, Bishop apparently felt that such an option is un-
available for Robinson-style infinitesimals, leading to his whole-
sale rejection of the latter.
(2) A related point is that the hyperreal approach incorporates an
element of non-constructivity at the basic level of the very num-
ber system itself.
(3) By replacing Weierstrassian epsilontics40 by a theory of infinites-
imals, non-standard analysis thereby removes the bread and
butter of constructive analysis, starting with the constructive
epsilontic definition of a Cauchy sequence, which involves an
explicit rate of convergence, see [23].
39See also footnotes 45, 52, and 80.
40A term used by Dauben [51]. The description of “epsilon, delta” arguments
as epsilontics (alternatively, epsilonics) is frequently found in the mathematical
literature, and even in the names of courses of instruction at certain North American
universities.
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Recall that Brouwer sought to incorporate a theory of the contin-
uum as part of intuitionistic mathematics, by dint of his free choice
sequences. Bishop’s commitment to integr-ity (see glossary in Subsec-
tion 6.2) led to his dismissal of Brouwer’s continuum as a “semimysti-
cal theory”.41 Such a commitment on Bishop’s part could hardly have
countenanced an about-face in the matter of the far denser thicket of
Robinson’s hyperreal continuum.
More fundamentally, we would like to argue that non-standard anal-
ysis presents a formidable philosophical challenge to constructivism,
which may, in fact, have been anticipated by Bishop himself in his
foundational speculations, as we explain below.
Bishop’s vision of mathematics is at variance both with Kronecker’s
constructivist program (see Subsection 2.1) and with Brouwer’s in-
tuitionism. Thus, Bishop’s constructive mathematics claims to be
uniquely concerned with finite operations on the integers. Meanwhile,
Bishop himself speculated that “the primacy of the integers is not ab-
solute”:
It is an empirical fact that all [finitely performable
abstract calculations] reduce to operations with the in-
tegers. There is no reason mathematics should not con-
cern itself with finitely performable abstract operations
of other kinds, in the event that such are ever discovered
[24, p. 53] [emphasis added–authors].
Bishop hereby acknowledges that the primacy of the integers is merely
what he describes as an empirical fact . The implication is that the said
primacy could be contradicted by novel mathematical developments.
Perhaps Bishop sensed that a rigorous theory of infinitesimals is both
• not reducible to finite calculations on the integers, and yet
• accomodates a finite performance of abstract operations,
thereby satisfying his requirements for legitimate mathematics. Bishop
made a foundational commitment to the primacy of the integers (a
state of mind known as integr-ity , see Subsection 6.2) through his own
work and that of his disciples starting in the late sixties. He may there-
fore have found it quite impossible, in the seventies, to acknowledge the
existence of “finitely performable abstract operations of other kinds”.
We will analyze the related issue of post-LEM numerical meaning in
Subsection 5.2.
41See main text at footnote 60 for the full quote.
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3.4. Galley proof “debasement”. It has recently come to light that
Bishop’s “debasement” remark, published in his Crisis text [25], in re-
ality was never uttered in his oral presentation in the presence of the
distinguished audience42 at the 1974 workshop in Boston. A careful
reading of Bishop’s Crisis text already suggests that his “debasement”
comment may have been added at the galley proof stage, as its dele-
tion from the text causes no interruption of textual continuity. In
fact, the second-named author has been able to locate a participant
in the workshop, who confirmed that Bishop said nothing about non-
standard analysis in his oral presentation. The participant in question,
a historian of mathematics, wrote as follows on the subject of Bishop’s
statement published in 1975 on Robinson-style infinitesimal calculus:
I do not remember that any such statement was made
at the workshop and doubt seriously that it was in fact
made. I would have pursued the issue vigorously, since
I had a particular point of view about the introduc-
tion of non-standard analysis into calculus. I had been
considering that question somewhat in my attempts to
understand various standards of rigor in mathematics.
The statement would have fired me up [131].
Furthermore, the text [123], entitled Commentary on E. Bishop’s talk ,
states clearly that the said commentary was based on a transcript of
Bishop’s actual talk at the workshop. When the second-named author
contacted the authors of the said Commentary in the summer of 2009,
it turned out that neither was aware of the fact that the published
version of Bishop’s Crisis essay contained a paragraph on the subject
of non-standard analysis.43 Thus, Bishop appears to have added his
42See footnote 78.
43In fact, Stolzenberg replied on 23 june 2009 to the effect that he is “morally cer-
tain [that Bishop] didn’t mention non-standard analysis during that lecture”. The
second-named author subsequently requested a copy of the transcript of Bishop’s
lecture (on which the Commentary [123] was based). The reply arrived on 17 august
2009, and consisted of three parts:
(1) it acknowledged that the authors are in possession of such a transcript;
(2) it denied the request for a copy of the transcipt;
(3) it expressed concern about “the harm” that would result if this writer were
to obtain a copy of the trascript.
The tenor of these remarks suggests that in fact the transcript of Bishop’s talk con-
tains no mention of non-standard analysis whatsoever, which would therefore prove
that the addition of the vitriolic paragraph was an afterthought. The community of
historians of mathematics should encourage Stolzenberg to release the transcript of
Bishop’s lecture in Stolzenberg’s possession, as it represents an important historical
document.
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“debasement” comment on non-standard calculus at the galley proof
stage of publication.
To be sure, additional material is frequently added at galley stage.
Was the addition of the “debasement” comment ethically problematic?
Note the published version of Bishop’s lecture includes an epilogue.
The epilogue contains the discussion (following the lecture), involving
Birkhoff, Mackey, J.P.Kahane, and others, who have challenged Bishop
on a number of points. None of the participants challenged Bishop on
his criticism of infinitesimals a` la Robinson. This reader at least of
Bishop’s essay was disappointed, upon his first reading of the essay,
not to find any challenge to Bishop’s “debasement” of non-standard
analysis, in the discussion that ensued. We now understand why there
was no such challenge: Bishop did not say a word about Robinson in
his oral presentation.
The important ethical point concerns the juxtaposition of Bishop’s
vitriolic comment (added at galley stage) concerning non-standard anal-
ysis, and an absence of any reaction to it in the ensuing discussion. Such
a juxtaposition is misleading, as it suggests, if not agreement, then at
least a tolerance toward Bishop’s comment on the part of the partic-
ipants in the discussion panel, raising issues of integrity (without the
dash).44 The vitriolic tenor of Bishop’s remark was aimed ostensibly at
Robinson-style infinitesimal calculus, but logically would apply equally
well to the rest of mainstream mathematics, as we discuss in the next
subsection.45
3.5. A hypothesis and its refutation. Bishop diagnosed classical
mathematics with a case of a “debasement of meaning” in his Schizophre-
nia in contemporary mathematics , written in 1973.46 Hot on the heels
of Schizophrenia came the 1975 Crisis in contemporary mathemat-
ics [25], where the same “debasement of meaning” diagnosis was slapped
upon infinitesimal calculus a` la Robinson. It is therefore transparent
that his opposition to Robinson-style infinitesimals is merely an in-
stance of a broad opposition to classical mathematics as a whole, on
ideological/foundational grounds.
44Bishop should have been aware of the fact that the follow-up discussion will be
included in the published version of his lecture. In order to avoid misunderstand-
ings, he could have easily included a footnote to the effect that the non-standard
paragraph was added at the galley proof stage, but he didn’t.
45See Section 3.5 and Feferman’s comment cited in footnote 31, as well as foot-
notes 39, 52, and 80.
46See Bishop [27, p. 1].
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Nonetheless, a hypothesis has been advanced by a number of con-
structivists47 that Bishop’s criticism of infinitesimal calculus a` la Robin-
son was motivated primarily by pedagogical, rather than foundational,
concerns. According to such a hypothesis, his objection focused on
the use of the extension principle and the transfer principle of non-
standard analysis (see Appendix A), whose acceptance by the student
would necessarily be on the grounds of trust in the teacher.48
However, such a hypothesis does not stand up to scrutiny, as we
argue below. A widespread perception of a foundational motivation
behind Bishop’s criticism of non-standard analysis has been attested
to by M. Davis, V. Komkov, J. Dauben, H. J. Keisler, D. Tall, and
others, and is not a novel interpretation.
Thus, M. Davis comments that Bishop states his objections “with-
out informing his readers of the constructivist context in which this
objection is presumably to be understood” [55, p. 1008]. Physicist
V. Komkov notes that
Bishop is one of the foremost researchers favoring the
constructive approach to mathematical analysis. It is
hard for a constructivist to be sympathetic to theories
replacing the real numbers by hyperreals [122, p. 270].49
Philosopher of mathematics G. Hellman writes:
Some of Bishop’s remarks (1967) suggest that his posi-
tion belongs in [the radical constructivist] category [95,
p. 222].
Historian of mathematics J. Dauben analyzed Bishop’s criticism and
found it to be “unfounded”.50
47Including Stolzenberg [166].
48It has been argued further that the idea of constructive mathematics is to found
mathematics on actions that everyone can concretely perform, in such a way that
mathematics is accessible for everyone. Let us examine the coherence of such an
argument (certain implications of a Bishop-style constructive approach in teaching
is examined in Subsection 4.1). The assumption of a completed (actual) infinity of Z
in Bishopian constructivism is a departure from Kronecker’s vision. It cannot be
“performed” in any concrete sense by either student or teacher. Nevertheless, both
constructivists and classical mathematicians acknowledge that such an assumption
facilitates both teaching and research in mathematics.
49Leaving aside the issue whether or not non-standard analysis can be done
constructively, Komkov’s perception of a foundational concern on Bishop’s part is
unmistakable.
50After evoking the success of nonstandard analysis “at the most elementary
level at which it could be introduced–namely, at which calculus is taught for the
first time”, Dauben proceeds to point out that “there is also a deeper level of
meaning at which nonstandard analysis operates.” Dauben mentions the impressive
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Through a comparative textual study of Bishop’s three texts, we
show that his criticism of non-standard analysis was motivated more
by foundational than by pedagogical issues.
1. Bishop’s perception of a shared shortcoming in non-standard cal-
culus, on the one hand, and classical mathematics pedagogy, on the
other, is evident from his contention that the former will
confirm the students’ previous experience [26, p. 208]
[emphasis added–authors].
of the latter. The usage of the term confirm points to a shared short-
coming.
2. The nature of such a shared shortcoming is hinted upon in his
reference to the students’ experience with classical mathematics as a
“meaningless exercise in technique” [26, p. 208] [emphasis added–
authors].
3. Note that the term meaning is alluded to elsewhere in his review, as
well. Thus, he laments that in “our educational system”, it is “a bad
form to ask what it all means” [26, p. 206]. The 1977 review is evasive
as to what exactly Bishop has in mind when he mentions meaning .
4. Meanwhile, Bishop’s Crisis essay [25] from 1975 focuses on the
virtue of numerical meaning , defined ultimately as the rejection of the
law of excluded middle even in its special case called LPO.51 Bishop
criticized non-standard calculus as a “debasement of meaning” in the
following terms:
It is difficult to believe that debasement of meaning
could be carried so far [25, 514] [emphasis added–
authors].
Bishop’s wording suggests that debasement of meaning had already
been spoken of, while, allegedly, this particular instance of it, is carried
particularly far . However, the Crisis text does not contain any other
occurrences of the three-word formation. Where was debasement of
meaning spoken of previously by Bishop?
5. The realm of applicability of the three-word formation is clarified in
Bishop’s essay Schizophrenia in contemporary mathematics [27]. The
applications in “physics, especially quantum theory and thermodynamics, and in
economics, where study of exchange economies has been particularly amenable to
nonstandard interpretation” (some references for such applications can be found in
Appendix A). At this deeper level of meaning, Dauben concludes: “Bishop’s views
can be questioned and shown to be as unfounded as his objections to nonstandard
analysis pedagogically” [47, p. 192].
51See footnote 31 for a more detailed discussion of Bishop’s LPO.
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essay was published posthumously in 1985, but M. Rosenblatt [154,
p. ix] points out that it was “distributed” in 1973. In other words,
Bishop’s Schizophrenia text was distributed a year or two prior to the
Crisis text. Bishop writes as follows:
Brouwer’s criticisms of classical mathematics were con-
cerned with what I shall refer to as “the debasement of
meaning” [27, p. 1].52
In Bishop’s own words, the debasement of meaning expression, em-
ployed in his Crisis text to refer to non-standard calculus, is in fact
a criticism of classical mathematics as a whole.53 The three-word for-
mation sailed effortlessly from Schizophrenia to Crisis , revealing its
author’s intention.
6. By the time Bishop got around to describing non-standard calculus
as a debasement of meaning [25, p. 514], he had already used the term
meaning as shorthand for numerical meaning in his invocation of a
philosophical principle, to the effect that a discussion ofmeaning should
precede a discussion of truth [25, p. 509].
7. Bishop’s remark about meaning preceding truth occurs in the con-
text of his analysis of the Brouwer-Hilbert controversy, which he at-
tributes to the fact that
“[t]hey attached different meanings to Cantorian set
theory” [25, p. 509] [emphasis added–authors]
8. Bishop provides an example explaining the meaning of an integer to
Brouwer:
“[f]or example, an integer to Brouwer [. . . ] is either a[
concrete] integer in decimal notation or a method that
in principle will lead after a finite number of steps to an
integer in decimal notation. Again there is this notion
of computability: if the integer is not given directly to
be sure that it is finitely computable.” [25, p. 509-510]
[emphasis added–authors]
52See also footnotes 39, 45, and 80.
53When Bishop’s usage of the identical expression, debasement of meaning, in
the context of both non-standard calculus and classical mathematics, was presented
in 2009 (as evidence of the claim of a foundational motivation on Bishop’s part
in criticizing non-standard calculus) to a constructivist and a close associate of
Bishop’s, he responded as follows: “Classical math here; non math major calculus
there. Two different kinds of debasement of meaning”. See footnote 75.
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9. Toward the end of an imaginary dialog between Brouwer and Hilbert,
Bishop has Brouwer express himself as follows on the subject of mean-
ing:
For me to do my mathematics in your system would
entail a significant loss of meaning54 [25, p. 511].
To Brouwer, as interpreted by Bishop, meaning is seen through the
lens of notions of computability , numerical meaning , and LEM. Mean-
while, Hilbert is uninterested in LEM extirpation; for him, the source
of meaning lies elsewhere.55
10. Thus, the shared shortcoming of infinitesimal calculus a` la Robin-
son and classical mathematics, in Bishop’s eyes, ultimately boils down
to a deficiency in numerical meaning, in other words, to a reliance on
LEM.
Through a comparative textual analysis of his three texts, we have
argued that Bishop’s grievance is foundationally motivated, even when
couched in a pedagogical idiom. Indeed, foundational ideology and
pedagogy were inseparable in Bishop’s thinking.
Our conclusion is that the Bishop-Keisler controversy was, in essence,
a foundational controversy, as suggested by J. Dauben, see [47, p. 177],
54Bishop does not speculate what Hilbert’s reply might have been to such a
charge of a loss of meaning, but we cannot help noting that for a classical math-
ematician to do mathematics in Brouwer’s system, would entail a significant loss
of post-LEM numerical meaning. Thus, H. Weyl, who became disillusioned with
the Brouwerian development by the 1930s, notes that “Mathematics with Brouwer
gains its highest intuitive clarity. He succeeds in developing the beginnings of anal-
ysis in a natural manner, all the time preserving the contact with intuition much
more closely than had been done before. It cannot be denied, however, that in ad-
vancing to higher and more general theories the inapplicability of the simple laws
of classical logic eventually results in an almost unbearable awkwardness. And
the mathematician watches with pain the larger part of his towering edifice which
he believed to be built of concrete blocks dissolve into mist before his eyes” [190,
p. 54] (see further in Feferman [67]). See also Subsection 5.2, and particularly
Example 5.3.
55Thus, Novikov [138] writes that, for all of Hilbert’s interest in a program of for-
malisation and axiomatisation, he understood such a program in a highly nontrivial
fashion. Novikov mentions, notably, Hilbert’s deep theorem [103] to the effect that
the Einstein equations of relativistic gravitation are of Lagrangian type. Novikov’s
essay is discussed further in Section 8.2. A detailed discussion of the significance,
and meaning, of Hilbert’s program may be found in Avigad and Reck [10]. See also
Corry’s quote of Hilbert (footnote 27).
MEANING IN CLASSICAL MATHEMATICS AND INTUITIONISM 29
[47, p. 190], and [47, p. 192],56 as well as by V. Komkov.57 The con-
troversy involved a fundamental disagreement concerning a basic ques-
tion, which can be formulated in terms of the dichotomy introduced
in Subsection 5.2, as follows. Is post-LEM numerical meaning , mathe-
matically coherent?
In conclusion, Bishop’s vitriolic criticism of infinitesimals a` la Robin-
son was but a salvo in his broadside attack on classical analysis and
classical mathematics as a whole, percolating through a number of
his foundational texts, and culminating in the posthumously published
charge of Schizophrenia [27].
3.6. Further background on refuted hypothesis. In the previous
section, we argued that Bishop’s criticism [25], [26] of non-standard cal-
culus was foundationally motivated. Here we provide some background
on the context of Bishop’s review, and clarify some of the pedagogical
and mathematical issues involved.
Bishop’s Crisis [25] tells an epic tale of how, half a century ear-
lier, a failure of communication between the two giants (Brouwer and
Hilbert), had, in Bishop’s view, the effect of derailing mathematics
from its numerical foundations, and set it on its present “meaningless”
course. Crisis also presents a vision of how mathematics may have
been rescued, had the Brouwer-Hilbert debate only followed a different
script (namely, the one specified in [25]), focusing on the foundational
issue of “principles of omniscience” and the problem of its acceptability.
In the midst of the epic tale, Bishop inserts58 a vitriolic paragraph
against Robinson-style infinitesimal calculus. To believe Bishop’s fol-
lowers, his unique concern is the best way to teach freshman calculus.
While a certain suspension of disbelief is required here, it should also
be pointed out that if the source of Bishop’s interest were indeed ped-
agogical, then he pursued it with extraordinary nonchalance.
The remarks he added to the galley proofs58 of [25] indicate that he
was already aware of infinitesimals in the classroom, at least two years
prior to writing his 1977 book review [26]. Meanwhile, K. Sullivan’s
1976 field study [169] of infinitesimals in the classroom was published
in a mainstream periodical, was easily accessible, and showed the in-
finitesimal approach to be more successful than the standard one in
imparting an ability to interpret the sense of mathematical formalism
of calculus. J. Dauben pointed out that
56See footnote 50.
57See footnote 49.
58See Subsection 3.4.
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[Sullivan’s] study [. . . ] was presumably available to Bishop
when his review of Keisler’s book appeared in 1977, in
which he attacked the pedagogical validity of nonstan-
dard analysis [47, p. 190].
Dauben analyzes Sullivan’s comparison of the nonstandard approach
and the traditional approach, with the conclusion that
contrary to Bishop’s views, the traditional [epsilontic]
approach to calculus may be the more pernicious [47,
p. 191].
Why wasn’t Sullivan’s study dealt with, one way or another, in Bishop’s
book review? Could it be because Bishop was not interested in field
studies? Could his opposition to the non-standard approach have been
based, not on any of its perceived shortcomings in imparting knowl-
edge of rates of change, derivatives, areas, integrals, etc., but rather on
ideological and foundational grounds? That a certain amount of foun-
dational material should be expected to be taken on trust in a first cal-
culus course, is a feature that infinitesimal-based calculus shares with
the standard approach. Very rare indeed is the first calculus course
that deals with equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences (or other con-
structions of the real number field). In the decade of his life that
Bishop seems to have become interested in calculus methodologies, he
is not known to have written critical book reviews of any methodologies
other than the hyperreal one, which–curious coincidence!–incorporates
an element of non-constructivity at the basic level of the very number
system itself.59
Having already written, about Bertus Brouwer himself, that
“Brouwer’s bugaboo has been compulsive speculation
about the nature of the continuum. His fear seems to
have been that, unless he personally intervened to pre-
vent it, the continuum would turn out to be discrete.
[The result was Brouwer’s] semimystical theory of the
continuum”60 [23, p. 6 and 10],
was Bishop likely to take lying down, a far denser thicket of Robinson’s
hyperreals? Could his interest have been foundationally motivated, as
indeed it was perceived by many of the readers of the Bulletin, as is
readily acknowledged even by Bishop’s followers?
To elaborate, note that Bishop quotes Keisler’s observation that
59See footnote 63 for Robinson’s take on number systems.
60See also main text at footnote 41.
MEANING IN CLASSICAL MATHEMATICS AND INTUITIONISM 31
“we have no way of knowing what a line in physical
space is really like. It might be like the hyperreal line,
the real line, or neither. However, in applications of the
calculus, it is helpful to imagine a line in physical space
as a hyperreal line.”
Bishop himself does not comment, other than voicing a criticism as to
an alleged lack of supporting evidence. His presentation suggests that
Bishop himself favors the classical real line. Yet Bishop states clearly
in his Manifesto [23] that from his constructivist viewpoint, it is LEM,
and not the axiom of choice, that is the source of non-constructivity.61
To summarize, Bishop seeks to convince his classical reader of the
idealistic nature (see glossary in Section 6.2) of a Robinson infinitesi-
mal, whereas to Bishop himself, the classical continuum62 should not
“have been put there in the first place” any more than a Robinson
infinitesimal, as the classical construction of both relies on the law of
excluded middle. The similar foundational status of the classical con-
tinuum, on the one hand, and the hyperreal number, on the other,
constitutes an astonishing point of convergence between Bishop and
Robinson.63
On the subject of Keisler’s infinitesimals, Bishop had this to say:
We are not told what an infinitesimal ∆x is [. . . ] Keisler
has developed limits from a supposedly consistent sys-
tem of axioms [. . . ] But he has not explained the axioms.
They are mere conveniences for generating proofs, whose
intuitive content will certainly escape the students [26,
p. 207] [emphasis added–authors].
What exactly is the source of Bishop’s certainty? The point is
not so much that, having taught calculus effectively, first-hand, from
Keisler’s book, this author disagrees with Bishop’s assessment as to
the effectiveness of Keisler’s method.64 Rather, the point is that the
nature, and the language, of Bishop’s criticisms clearly reveal an ax-
iomatic/foundational preoccupation.
61See our main text around footnote 70.
62He felt similarly about Brouwer’s continuum; see footnote 24 and the main
text at footnote 60.
63Concerning the reality of number systems, Robinson expressed himself as fol-
lows: “[T]he infinitely small and infinitely large numbers of a non-standard model
of Analysis are neither more nor less real than, for example, the standard irrational
numbers [. . . ] both standard irrational numbers and non-standard numbers are
introduced by certain infinitary processes” [148, p. 282].
64See [109, 110] for details.
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Dauben [51] also understood Bishop’s “debasement of meaning” crit-
icism of non-standard calculus as referring to an alleged lack of nu-
merical meaning.65 The latter is Bishop’s term for the sine qua non
ingredient of constructively acceptable mathematics. The lack of nu-
merical meaning, to Bishop, corresponds to a reliance on LPO or more
generally, the law of excluded middle (see glossary in Subsection 6.2).
The over-reliance on the teacher’s authority, in Bishop’s view, is only
a shortcoming if such authority is propped up by a non-constructive
arsenal such as excluded middle or classical choice. Bishop expresses
the sentiment that
the notorious ǫ, δ definition of limit is common sense
[26, p. 208] [emphasis added–authors].
He further shares with the reader the following confidence: “[the stu-
dents] don’t believe me”. Dauben speculates that there may be a very
good reason for their disbelief, namely,
that what [Bishop] claims, in fact, does not seem to be
true [51, p. 134].
The vast education literature on the student reception of quantifiers
(see a useful bibliography in [187]) attests to the irreducible difficulty
of properly inculcating an understanding of even a single alternation
of quantifiers, let alone an iteration of such alternations involved in
the ǫ, δ definition.66
However, our main goal here is not to gauge the difficulty of Weier-
strassian definition of the limit concept based on epsilontics. Rather,
the point is to signal the nonchalance of Bishop’s comments, if they
are to be interpreted as pedagogically motivated.
Interpreted as foundationally motivated, on the other hand, Bishop’s
comments become intelligible. In traditional (LEM-dominated) math-
ematics courses, students become accustomed to going through the nu-
merically meaningless motions of idealistic mathematics (see glossary
in Section 6.2), so that by the time they reach Bishop’s classroom and
are exposed to the numerically meaningful content of Weierstrassian
epsilontics, they are put off by its pristine “common sense”. As part
of a constructivist critique of the foundations, Bishop’s criticism is
intelligible and compelling, even if ultimately flawed, as we argue in
Section 8.
For all its touted advantages of increasing numerical meaning by
means of a constructivisation of all that can be constructivized, Bishop’s
65See footnote 50.
66A detailed discussion of a typical case study appears in the main text at foot-
note 69.
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approach is not without its pitfalls. Note that a “de-basement” of main-
stream mathematics is what constructivism is sometimes attempting to
carry out, by changing the meaning of basic terms such as continuous
function and finite set , as analyzed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
4. De-basing in constructivism
A number of familiar terms in the mathematical lexicon are displaced
from their base, or basic, meaning when they are rendered constructive.
We will analyze several such phenomena in this section.
4.1. Verbal equality. Bishop’s own approach to constructive math-
ematics only accepts uniformly continuous functions (more precisely,
uniformly continuous on compact intervals); they are accordingly re-
named continuous in Bishop’s foundational text [23].67 S. Feferman
writes that Bishop deals with
a very special class of functions of real numbers, namely
those which are uniformly continuous on [e]very com-
pact interval. In this way, he finesses the whole issue of
how one arrives at Brouwer’s theorem [to the effect that
every function on a closed interval is uniformly contin-
uous]68 by saying that those are the only functions, at
least initially, that one is going to talk about [66].
Continuity differs from uniform continuity in at least the following
three ways:
(1) continuity can be defined in terms of limits;
(2) continuity is a pointwise concept;
(3) only 3 quantifiers are required to define continuity at a point.
To elaborate, note that a typical calculus textbook [180, p. 108] de-
fines continuity in terms of a previously defined notion of the limit. This
is possible because ordinary continuity is a local (pointwise) property,
whereas to define uniform continuity, one needs to work with pairs of
points. Thus, the definition of uniform continuity [180, p. 115] requires
a return to ǫ, δ’s.
Most textbooks adopt the standard Weierstrassian approach using
epsilontics. When it comes to continuity and uniform continuity, both
67While Bishop, at the time of writing [23], appears to have thought that such
functions were the only ones that would enter into numerically meaningful math-
ematics, subsequent research has shown that even sequential continuity (construc-
tively strictly weaker than even pointwise continuity) arises naturally in construc-
tive functional analysis; see Ishihara [106].
68A discussion of the issue of the finessing of Brouwerian counterexamples in the
context of the extreme value theorem appears in Subsection 4.3.
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definitions involve alternations of quantifiers. However, pedagogically
speaking, one can present the definition of ordinary continuity with
only three quantifiers, once the point has been fixed. There is no such
device that would permit a definition of uniform continuity with fewer
than four quantifiers. Such a definition is almost inaccessible for an
average undergraduate.
A revealing case study [69] documents an effort properly to ex-
plain ǫ, δ to students at “a state university with an enrollment of
15,000”, using an interactive approach that reportedly generated con-
siderable interest on the part of the students. It emerges that due to
the intrinsic difficulty of the subject matter, the semester was spent
explaining ǫ, δ for linear functions. The course itself never reached
quadratic functions, but a number of students “began coming to office
hours on a regular basis” to get a taste of the quadratic case. The
author concludes that
[a]lthough the ideas concerning quadratics were pursued
outside of class with only a limited number of students,
it is important to note that the students initiated this
discussion and pursued it on their own time [69, p. 53].69
For educators, it is no mystery why Johnny can’t take limits (see
Roh [153]). Many teachers, based on classroom experience, feel that
uniform continuity is a concept that is even more difficult for students
to grasp than ordinary continuity.
Bishop’s renaming of uniformly continuous functions as continuous ,
is part of a pattern commented upon by reviewer B. van Rootselaar
(for Mathscinet) of Bishop’s book [23], who writes as follows:
The comparison with classical mathematics carried out
by the author in the notes accompanying the chapters
is somewhat superficial. In fact the author stresses the
equal hypothesis interpretations of classical theorems,
which is misleading since the hypotheses are for the
greater part only verbally equal [182].
What van Rootselaar is referring to is the fact that some of the
theorems are worded in such a way as to sound identical to the classical
ones, but, of course, the definitions have been tampered with, e.g. what
is defined as continuity is really uniform continuity , classically speaking
(See also Hellman [93]).
69There are indeed numerous case studies of this sort; see e.g. [187].
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Apart from the issue of verbal equality , the numerical advantage
of Bishop’s approach has been neatly summarized by Feferman, who
pointed out that in constructive analysis,
concepts are chosen so that there is a lot of witnessing
information introduced in a way that is not customary in
classical mathematics, where it is hidden, for instance,
by implicit use of the axiom of choice [66].
4.2. Goodman-Myhill’s 11
2
± 1
2
sets and “full” choice. What does
the term finite mean? In this section we will comment on the construc-
tive distinction between finite and subfinite sets, in the context of a
result relating the axiom of choice and LEM.
A theorem dating from 1975, alternatively referred to as the the
Diaconescu theorem [57] or the Goodman-Myhill theorem [81], asserts
that the axiom of choice implies the law of excluded middle.
There is an intriguing point here that Bishop actually claimed that he
has no quarrel with the axiom of choice. In his Constructive manifesto,
eight years prior to the publication of Diaconescu-Goodman-Myhill, he
wrote:
the axiom of choice [. . . ] is not a real source of the
unconstructivities of classical mathematics [. . . ] [it] is
used to extract elements from equivalence classes where
they should never have been put in the first place [23,
p. 9].
His remark has apparently been a source of discomfort for some of
his followers.70 Understanding the proof of the Diaconescu-Goodman-
Myhill theorem hinges on the following critical distinction between fi-
nite and subfinite sets.71 A set possessing either one or two elements
(we don’t know which) cannot be called finite in the constructive sense.
Finding a choice function for a collection of sets containing either one
or two sets (we don’t know which) requires a nontrivial application of
the “full” axiom of choice. The theorem is proved by means of such an
application of the axiom of choice (see Subsection 2.3 for a discussion
70It appears to some, if not all, constructive interpreters that Bishop’s remark
was, if studied carefully, perfectly in order, if less than perfectly expressed; see [28,
p. 13].
71The constructivist position on the issue can be summarized as follows. The
contention that the image of a finite set under a function f need not be finite,
has precise meaning in a constructive context, reflecting a deficiency of numerical
meaning in a classical assertion of its finiteness.
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of the nature of the quantifiers in the axiom of choice).72 Note that
we are dealing with a collection of sets containing 11
2
± 1
2
sets (namely,
either 1 or 2 sets).73
Note that the law of excluded middle is a constructive consequence
of much more elementary statements than that of the full axiom of
choice.74
4.3. Is Bishopian constructivism compatible with classical logic?
We will examine the question of such compatibility in this subsection,
in the context of the extreme value theorem. Note that the extreme
value theorem does not hold constructively. Namely, the existence of
a maximum of a continuous function f on [0, 1], in the sense of the
constructive formula
(∃InLo x ∈ [0, 1]) (f(x) = sup(f)) ,
does not hold. Indeed, let a be any real number such that
a ≤ 0 or a ≥ 0 is unknown.
Next, define f on [0, 1] by
f(x) := ax.
Then sup(f) is simply max(0, a), but the point where it is attained
cannot be captured constructively (see [181, p. 295]). To elaborate on
the foundational status of this example, note that the law of excluded
middle: P ∨ ¬P (“either P or (not P )”), is the strongest principle
rejected by constructivists. A weaker principle is the LPO (limited
principle of omniscience). The LPO is the main target of Bishop’s
criticism in [25]. The LPO is formulated in terms of sequences, as the
principle that it is possible to search “a sequence of integers to see
72For the benefit of a classically-trained reader it may be helpful to clarify that
the “fullness” of the power of the axiom of choice referred to here is not in the
usual sense, of applying it to a collection of sets of arbitrarily high cardinality, but
rather to the omniscience aspect of the axiom of choice (see discussion of LPO
in Subsection 3.1), stemming from the classical interpretation the the existence
quantifier.
73The distinctions made by constructive mathematicians are real and important
if you want to work constructively. Yet they often look odd if you cannot step
outside the classical framework.
74 Let P be any statement, and let S = {0}∪ {x : x = 1∧ (P ∨¬P )}. Then S is
a subset of {0, 1} that certainly contains 0; but 1 ∈ S if and only if P ∨ ¬P holds.
Thus if under the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of logic, we could
prove that every inhabited subset of {0, 1} either contains exactly one element, or
contains both 0 and 1, then we could prove the law of excluded middle. So the
law of excluded middle is a constructive consequence of much more elementary
statements than that of the full axiom of choice.
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whether they all vanish” [25, p. 511]. The LPO is equivalent to the law
of trichotomy:
(a < 0) ∨ (a = 0) ∨ (a > 0).
An even weaker principle is
(a ≤ 0) ∨ (a ≥ 0),
whose failure is exploited in the construction of the counterexample un-
der discussion. This property is false intuitionistically. After discussing
real numbers x ≥ 0 such that it is “not” true that x > 0 or x = 0,
Bishop writes:
In much the same way we can construct a real number x
such that it is not true that x ≥ 0 or x ≤ 0 [23, p. 26],
[28, p. 28].
The fact that an a satisfying ¬((a ≤ 0) ∨ (a ≥ 0)) yields a coun-
terexample f(x) = ax to the extreme value theorem (EVT) on [0, 1] is
alluded to by Bishop in [23, p. 59, exercise 9]; [28, p. 62, exercise 11].
Meanwhile, Bridges interprets Bishop’s italicized “not” as referring to
a Brouwerian counterexample, and asserts that trichotomy as well as
the principle (a ≤ 0) ∨ (a ≥ 0) are independent of Bishopian construc-
tivism. See D. Bridges [33] for details; a useful summary may be found
in Taylor [177].
The extreme value theorem illustrates well the fact that a verifica-
tional interpretation of the quantifiers in Bishopian mathematics nec-
essarily results in a clash with classical mathematics; it is merely a
matter of tactical emphasis that the clash is minimized in Bishopian
constructivism.
5. Are there two constructivisms?
5.1. Numerical constructivism or anti-LEM constructivism?
G. Hellman has distinguished between liberal and radical versions of
constructivism in [95]. The dichotomy75 was picked up both by by
H. Billinge [21] and by E. Davies [53]. Rather than borrowing terms
from political science, we will exploit terms that are somewhat more
self-explanatory in a mathematical context.
What are the goals of constructive mathematics? Bishop in his 1975
Crisis essay [25] emphasizes a quest for numerical meaning (see Sub-
section 3.1).
75While such a dichotomy seems to have taken root among the philosophers of
mathematics, it may take time to penetrate the radical defenses.
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It seems reasonable to assume that a mainstream mathematician can
relate favorably to the methodological approach that seeks greater nu-
merical meaning, as enunciated by Bishop in [25]. Such an approach
could be described as numerical constructivism, or rather, numerically
meaningful constructivism. A methodological approach, complement-
ing other approaches, could be a companion to classical mathematics,
while at the same time recognizing the coherence of post-LEM numer-
ical meaning (see Subsection 5.2).
On the other hand, when the emphasis shifts to the extirpation of
the law of excluded middle from the mathematical toolkit, whether
there is numerical benefit or loss76 in such a quest, one arrives at an
approach that could be termed anti-LEM constructivism, conceived
of as an alternative to classical mathematics, and viewing LEM as a
variety of mathematical phlogiston.77
To summarize, Bishop’s comments could lead to two distinct con-
ceptions of constructivism:
(1) numerical constructivism, a companion to classical mathemat-
ics; and
(2) anti-LEM constructivism, an alternative to classical mathemat-
ics.
Returning to Bishop’s Crisis essay [25], we note that when he found
himself in front of a distinguished audience at the Boston workshop,78
he chose to emphasize the goal of seeking greater numerical meaning
over the goal of the elimination of LEM. Such an attitude is apparently
consistent with Heyting’s approach discussed above.
Elsewhere, however, Bishop adopts a different approach, implying
that unless one extirpates LEM, one’s mathematics falls in the range
between obfuscation and debasement of meaning . In short, constructive
mathematics is posited, not as a companion, but rather as a replace-
ment for and alternative to, classical mathematics.
Should the gentle reader feel that our description of an anti-LEM
species of constructivism is exaggerated, she should ponder H. Billinge’s
comment reproduced below. Billinge’s sympathies for constructivism
have led her to issue a philosophical challenge, so as
76Specifically, one loses the intuitively appealing infinitesimal definitions of the
calculus, certain results of mathematical physics, the calculus of variations, soap
films and bubbles (see Subsection 8.2), and other types of post-LEM numerical
meaning discussed in Subsection 5.2.
77See Subsection 6.1 on Pourciau’s phlogiston metaphor.
78His audience included Birkhoff, Dieudonne´, Freudental, J.P.Kahane, Kline,
and Mackey.
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to settle the matter of whether we should permit or
prohibit the use of classical mathematics79 [20, p. 317]
[emphasis added–authors].
Elsewhere, Billinge has claimed that E. Bishop is not a radical con-
structivist:
We can safely say that Bishop was a liberal construc-
tivist [21, p. 187].
Yet, one wonders what Billinge would make of Bishop’s published opin-
ion to the effect that
Very possibly classical mathematics will cease to exist
as an independent discipline [24, p. 54].80
Furthermore, Bishop’s vitriolic book review [26] is absent from Billinge’s
bibliography, and she makes no attempt to explain Bishop’s “debase-
ment” comments [25, p. 513-514] and [27, p. 1] targeting classical math-
ematics as a whole.
5.2. Hilbert and post-LEM meaning. To elaborate further on the
difference between the two approaches to constructivism discussed in
Subsection 5.1, we will examine the attitude toward calculus, from the
perspective of the formalist/intuitionist debate. The infinitesimal def-
inition of the derivative was already envisioned by the founders of the
calculus, and was justified by A. Robinson (see Appendix A). Heyt-
ing is able to appreciate such an accomplishment (see Subsection 7.3),
firmly grounded, as it was, in classical logic, making it unacceptable to
an anti-LEM constructivist.
An infinitesimal definition certainly leads to computationally mean-
ingful formulas for the derivatives of the standard functions, even though
classical logic was relied upon by Robinson. To emphasize the differ-
ence between the two types of numerical meaning, we introduce the
following distinction.
We will refer to the content of mathematics that is fully constructive
from the bottom (i.e. integers) up, as pre-LEM numerical meaning ,
and to the content of mathematics that has indisputable numerical or
79Note that in Hellman’s view [98, p. 439], “any [. . . ] attempt to reinstate a
‘first philosophical’ theory of meaning prior to all science is doomed”. What this
appears to mean is that, while there can certainly be a philosophical notion of
meaning before science, any attempt to prescribe standards of meaning prior to
the actual practice of science, is doomed . See also discussion of Dummett in main
text at footnote 105.
80See also footnotes 39, 45, and 52.
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computational meaning, while at the same time relying on LEM at
some intermediate stage, as post-LEM numerical meaning .81
Pre-LEM numerical meaning is, of course, exemplified by Founda-
tions of constructive analysis [23]. We will now present several ex-
amples of post-LEM numerical meaning, following Euclid, Leibniz,
Hilbert, Loewner, Connes, Yau, and Avigad.
Example 5.1. An early example of what we consider post-LEM nu-
merical meaning is given by geometric constructions in antiquity.
The volume calculations in Archimedes appear to rely on proofs by
contradiction. Thus, a contradiction is derived from the assumption
that the volume x of the unit sphere is smaller than two-thirds of the
volume of the circumscribed cylinder, and similarly for greater than.
The contradiction proves that the volume is exactly two-thirds . The
proof appears to depend on the trichotomy for real numbers:
(x < y) ∨ (x = y) ∨ (x > y),
where y is two-thirds of the volume of the cylinder. We start with the
trichotomy, eliminate the possibilities on the right and on the left, to
conclude that the possibility in the middle (equality) is the correct one.
However, the proof can be modified slightly to meet the requirements
of Bishop’s framework. Thus, proving first that ¬(x < y) implies x ≥ y
(but not vice versa)82 and ¬(x > y) implies x ≤ y, to conclude that x =
y without appealing to trichotomy.
Meanwhile, Euclid’s constructions were recently examined, and found
to be lacking, from a constructivist viewpoint, by M. Beeson [14].
Beeson succeeds in reformulating much of Euclid in a constructively
acceptable fashion, namely without “test-for-equality” constructions
(such constructions rely on LEM so as to be able to consider the two
cases A = B and A 6= B separately).
Beeson’s work is no doubt a significant accomplishment. Yet one
can question the ideological assumption that, due to their reliance on
LEM, Euclid’s arguments were somehow lacking in meaning prior to
Beeson’s arrival on the scene. Will such an assumption be shared by
all of Beeson’s readers?
81See main text preceding footnote 114 for an analysis of Richman’s views in the
light of our pre/post-LEM dichotomy.
82One cannot derive, constructively, x < y by getting a contradiction from the
assumption that x ≥ y. Note that the formula ¬(x < y) → (x ≥ y) implies its
contrapositive ¬(x ≥ y) → ¬¬(x < y), but double negation ¬¬(x < y) does not
imply x < y if one is working constructively.
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Example 5.2. Leibniz’s calculus was based on an apparently compu-
tationally questionable entity. Indeed, the theoretical entity called the
infinitesimal appeared to have no empirical or computational counter-
part.83 Thus, the algorithms for computing derivatives as developed
by Leibniz, appear to rely upon non-constructive foundational mate-
rial. Infinitesimal calculus remains in the post-LEM category even after
Robinson’s work, due to the nature of the construction of the hyperreal
number system (but see Palmgren [139]).
Example 5.3. The Einstein-Hilbert action (alternatively, Einstein-
Hilbert Lagrangian) is the action that yields Einstein’s field equations
for the spacetime metric in general relativity. S. P. Novikov [138] writes
that, for all of Hilbert’s interest in a program of formalisation and
axiomatisation, he understood such a program in a highly nontrivial
fashion. Novikov mentions, notably, Hilbert’s deep theorem [103] to
the effect that the Einstein equations of relativistic gravitation are of
Lagrangian type. The equations are thereby placed in the context of a
variational problem. Novikov’s essay is discussed further in Section 8.2,
in the context of the general difficulty of accounting constructively for
variational principles.84 This is only the most famous example of a
meaningful variational problem that possesses an undeniable meaning
of a post-LEM variety.
Example 5.4. Loewner’s torus inequality (see Katz [108]) is proved
using the uniformisation theorem, which is not fully constructive. Yet
the inequality itself possesses indisputable numerical meaning. The
inequality relates a pair of metric invariants of a Riemannian 2-torus T.
The first is the least length, denoted Sys, of a loop on T that cannot
be contracted to a point on T. The second invariant is the total area,
denoted Area, of T. The inequality, Sys2 ≤ 2√
3
Area, is illustrated in
Figure 8.1. Mikhail Gromov writes as follows:
I was exposed to metric inequalities in the late 60’s
by Yu. Burago, who acquainted me with the results of
Loewner, Pu, and Besicovitch. These attracted me by
the topological purity of their underlying assumptions,
83This aspect of the infinitesimal was a source of Berkeley’s metaphysical crit-
icism (Berkeley’s criticism was dissected into its metaphysical and logical compo-
nents by D. Sherry [161]). Berkeley’s empiricist philosophy stemming from his
perception-based theory of knowledge, tolerated no theoretical entities without an
empirical referent.
84With hindsight, it can be said that a critique of intuitionism based on varia-
tional principles, rather than boxer’s fists, may have been a more effective critique
by Hilbert.
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and I was naturally tempted to prove similar inequalities
in a more general topological framework [88, p. 271-272].
It is not even clear that a weaker version Sys2 < ( 2√
3
+ ǫ) Area can be
obtained in the absence of LEM.
Example 5.5. Alain Connes’ theory of infinitesimals is based on non-
constructive foundational material.85 Connes wrote as follows:
Our theory of infinitesimal variables [. . . ] will give a
precise computable answer [42, p. 6207].
Connes claims that his infinitesimals provide a computable answer to
a probability problem outlined earlier in his text. A constructivist who
cares to analyze Connes’ remarks, is faced with a stark choice: either
accept the coherence of post-LEM numerical meaning as exemplified
by applications of Connes’ infinitesimals, or consider the founder of one
of the most active fields of mathematical physics as being incoherent
when talking about “computable” answers.
Example 5.6. The existence of Calabi-Yau metrics [192], influential
both in differential geometry and in high-energy physics, appears to
be non-constructive, as it relies on the calculus of variations, including
numerous applications of versions of the extreme value theorem on
several levels in infinite-dimensional spaces. In this sense, Calabi-Yau
metrics pose the same problem to an anti-LEM constructivist as the
Hilbert-Einstein action (see Example 5.3).
Example 5.7. A detailed study by J. Avigad [9] of ergodic theory
can be viewed as an analysis of post-LEM numerical meaning, in the
context of ergodic theory. More generally, the technique of proof mining
seeks to extract numerical content from non-constructive proofs, using
logical tools, see U. Kohlenbach and P. Oliva [120].
Foundationally speaking, the acceptance of the validity of post-LEM
numerical meaning may well be a fall-back to Hilbert’s position, called
syntactic modeling by Avigad [9]. It is deemed acceptable to intro-
duce non-constructive techniques, so long as one could not derive any-
thing unacceptable from them, where “unacceptable” means numeri-
cally testable results that are found to be false.86
Attempting to analyze Hilbert’s position, Stolzenberg writes as fol-
lows:
85See footnote 115.
86Syntactic modeling may have been at the origin of Hilbert’s interest in proving
consistency. It is generally considered that Hilbert’s hopes for a consistency proof
have been dashed by Goedel’s incompleteness theorems, but see Feferman [65] and
Avigad and Reck [10] for a more nuanced picture.
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Hilbert saw formal mathematics as a way of reaching
the real by passing through the ideal. That is, one may
use all the formal machinery, in particular, nonconstruc-
tive but formally valid existence statements (such as the
Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem), to prove, formally, real
propositions, i.e. predictive ones [164].
Stolzenberg concludes on the following optimistic note:
However, not only are such considerations largely ig-
nored or blurred nowadays, but we have already quoted,
and can confirm, Bishop’s observation that in practice
such proofs are already constructive or can easily be
made so [164].
Stolzenberg examines Hilbert’s defense of classical mathematics (based
as it is on classical logic, including LEM), and finds it superfluous.
In our terminology introduced earlier, Stolzenberg appears to claim
that post-LEM numerical meaning “can easily be made” pre-LEM.
Now the constructivisation of classical results may succeed (at any rate
modulo strengthening the hypotheses or weakening the conclusions,
see Subsection 4.1) in the case of statements such as the intermediate
value theorem (perhaps even, as implied by Stolzenberg, the Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem), and the like. But Bishop apparently believed
that a Robinson infinitesimal resists constructivisation.
5.3. How could an intuitionist accept the hyperreals? If both
forms of constructivism discussed in Subsection 5.1 are opposed to the
law of excluded middle, then wouldn’t Robinson’s theory run afoul
of both, seeing that non-standard analysis rests on non-constructive
foundations of classical logic?
To answer the question, we will start by pointing out that the burden
of explanation is upon the constructivists on at least the following two
counts:
(1) How is it that one of their own, A. Heyting, described Robin-
son’s theory as not only meaningful but a standard model of
important mathematical research? (see Subsection 7.3 for an
analysis of Heyting’s comments).87
87Heyting gave the first formal development of intuitionistic logic in order to cod-
ify Brouwer’s way of doing mathematics; yet, he unequivocally sides with the view
of intuitionism as a companion, rather than alternative, to classical mathematics
(see Subsection 7.3).
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(2) to the extent that non-standard analysis shares its foundations
with, and is therefore part of, mainstream mathematics, a re-
jection of the former entails a radical rejectionist stance (on the
part of the constructivist) that in particular encounters serious
difficulties vis-a-vis important results of relativity theory, such
as the Hawking–Penrose theorem, see Subsections 8.2 and 8.4.
Bishop sometimes seems to identify his notion of numerical mean-
ing , with meaning in a lofty epistemological sense, see Section 8, but
Heyting appears to view numerical meaning as a desirable, but not
exclusive, methodological goal. Thus, Bishop and Heyting disagree as
to the coherence of post-LEM numerical meaning (see Subsection 5.2).
Heyting’s position is not inconsistent with what we described in Sub-
section 5.1 as numerical constructivism, see also Subsection 7.2 below.
One can adopt the methodological goals of a search for greater nu-
merical meaning , without locking oneself into an anti-LEM construc-
tivism.88
In Heyting’s book [101], a protagonist named Class (apparently al-
luding to classical logic) asserts that “intuitionism should be studied
as a part of mathematics”. Note that a protagonist named Int (ap-
parently alluding to intuitionism) readily agrees to Class ’s contention
(see Subsection 7.2). Is Int merely being polite in conceding a point
to Class? There is no evidence in Heyting’s book that he is merely
being indirect. On the other hand, one could well analyze Bishop’s
comment in this light. When Bishop writes [25] that he “does not
know” whether non-standard analysis results in a loss of meaning, and
in the same paragraph proceeds to characterize non-standard calculus
as a debasement of the latter (see Section 3.1), one could feel that his
comments can be described as indirect .
6. The fervor of Bishopian constructivism
In this section, we seek to illustrate Bishop’s influence on the stan-
dards of the debate concerning the nature of mathematics.
6.1. Pourciau on phlogiston. The influence of Bishop’s radical phi-
losophy has been felt in the area of discourse and standards of civility,
in publications that have appeared in periodicals of the history and the
philosophy of mathematics. One of the most rousing affirmations of the
anti-LEM credo in English was penned by B. Pourciau and published
in the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science:
88See Crowe’s comment in the main text following footnote 10.
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The faith that sustains the classical world view emanates
from one belief more than any other: that mathemat-
ical assertions are true or false, independently of our
knowing which. Every conflict between classical and in-
tuitionist mathematics springs ultimately from this be-
lief. This is not a belief so much as a hidden cause:
it creates the world view—making, for example, proofs
by contradiction appear self-evidently correct—but re-
mains transparently in the background, unseen and un-
questioned [142, p. 319] [emphasis added–authors].
Such an unquestioning stance naturally leads to calcification, as
Pourciau continues:
Once created, the classical world view is sustained and
calcified by metaphor taken literally, by what Stolzen-
berg89 calls a
“present tense” language of “objects and their
properties”.
Talk about sets, functions, real numbers, theorems and
so on is taken by the classical mathematician as being
literally about mathematical objects that exist indepen-
dently of us, even though such talk, classically inter-
preted, has the appearance, and nothing more, of being
meaningful90 [142, p. 319] [emphasis added–authors].
The reader recognizes the pet constructivist term, meaning , already
analyzed in Subsection 3.1 (see also Subsection 6.2 below), as Pour-
ciau continues by quoting Stolzenberg as follows: “ ‘To anyone who
starts off in the contemporary mathematician’s belief system’, argues
Stolzenberg [165, p. 268],
the discovery that an entire component of the ‘reality’
of one’s experience is produced by acts of acceptance
as such in the domain of language use is not merely illu-
minating. In a literal sense, it is shattering. Once
a mathematician has seen that his perception of the
‘self-evident correctness’ of the law of excluded middle
is nothing more than the linguistic equivalent of an op-
tical illusion, neither his practice of mathematics nor his
understanding of it can ever be the same” [142, p. 319]
[emphasis added–authors].
89See [165, p. 225].
90Pourciau’s analysis of classical mathematics conflates two distinct positions,
described by W. Tait [171] as realism and super-realism.
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Pourciau’s introduction, with its talk of “conflict”, “acts of accep-
tance”, and “shattering” discoveries, is a good sample of an insur-
rectional narrative, two types of which are analyzed below in Subsec-
tions 6.3 and 6.4. J. Avigad, while agreeing that
[w]e do not need fairy tales about numbers and triangles
prancing about in the realm of the abstracta[,]
notes that
[p]roof-theoretic analysis [. . . ] yields satisfying philo-
sophical explanations as to how abstract, infinitary as-
sumptions have bearing on computational concerns, and
provides senses in which infinitary methods can be seen
to have finitary content [8].91
Having rounded off his “shattering” introduction, Pourciau now pre-
pares his main thesis by quoting G. Giorello as follows.
One may ask whether there is a ‘phlogiston’92 in mathe-
matics. . . . I would be inclined to say ‘No.’ This, in our
opinion, would constitute a difference between a math-
ematical revolution and a ‘revolution’ in Kuhn’s sense
[74, p. 168].
Pourciau takes this as evidence that Giorello does not argue against
the position, attributed to Crowe, that Kuhnian revolutions are “in-
herently impossible” in mathematics. Meanwhile, Pourciau himself
argues that, had Brouwer’s rejection of LEM been generally accepted,
it would in fact have constituted such a revolution. Thus Pourciau
appears to understand Intuitionism as viewing LEM as just such a va-
riety of phlogiston, a position we would characterize as anti-LEM (see
Subsection 5.1).
To elaborate, we argue as follows. Had Pourciau not thought of
LEM as mathematical phlogiston, he would not have taken Giorello’s
remarks as evidence that Giorello does not argue against Crowe’s con-
tention that revolutions never occur in mathematics. The contradiction
proves that Pourciau does in fact think of LEM as mathematical phlo-
giston. Our argument by contradiction, of course, is only meaningful
classically, and would presumably be incoherent in Pourciau’s preferred
intuitionistic framework. However, we include it here for the benefit of
a classically minded reader.
91For more details see Example 5.7 in Subsection 5.2 above.
92Phlogiston was once thought to be a fire-like element contained within com-
bustible bodies, and released during combustion, but became incommensurable 250
years ago.
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Pourciau’s novel view is that Brouwer’s Intuitionism constituted a,
failed, Kuhnian revolution. Pourciau motivates his view by dint of the
observation that certain classically true assertions become “incommen-
surable” in Brouwer’s framework. Note that the essence of Pourciau’s
view had already been captured by Giorello, who wrote that
“even rigorists like Weierstrass were labelled ‘metaphysi-
cians’ by strict constructivists like Weyl or Brouwer” [74,
p. 166].
Pourciau’s main example is the (classically true) assertion to the
effect that
in the infinite decimal expansion of π, either finitely
many pairs of consecutive equal digits occur, or infin-
itely many pairs occur [142, p. 305].
Pourciau describes this assertion as becoming “incommensurable” in
an intuitionistic framework. Based on the loss of such assertions in
an intuitionistic framework, Pourciau concludes that Intuitionism pos-
sessed a potential of developing into a unique mathematical Kuhnian
revolution. Pourciau writes that
from inside the classical paradigm [. . . ] Kuhnian rev-
olutions appear to be [. . . ] obviously impossible. But
from outside the classical paradigm, [. . . ] it is no longer
self-evident that Kuhnian revolutions cannot occur [142,
p. 300].
He argues that both Crowe and Dauben
see Kuhnian revolutions as logically impossible, because
to them [. . . ] any shift in conceptions of mathemat-
ics must be cumulative. [142, p. 301] [emphasis in the
original–the authors].
Pourciau views such cumulativity as a necessary consequence of the
classical (i.e. LEM-circumscribed) paradigm, suggesting that a Kuh-
nian revolution in mathematics would in fact be impossible, without
first extirpating LEM.
However, contrary to Pourciau’s claim, mathematical entities have
indeed become “incommensurable” through historical changes in math-
ematical practice, ever before intuitionism came on the scene.
Consider, for example, the largely successful assault on infinitesimals
in the aftermath of the rise of Weierstrassian epsilontics. Cauchy’s 1821
sum theorem [39] on the convergence (to a continuous limit) of a se-
ries of continuous functions under a suitable “pointwise” convergence,
was declared to be false in the absence of infinitesimals (see below).
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With hindsight, we can now affirm that Cauchy’s sum theorem had
been made “incommensurable” in the second half of the 19th century.
The sum theorem was only successfully “revived” fully a century later.
A similar observation applies to infinitesimals themselves (see Exam-
ple 5.2). Thus, Weierstrassian epsilontics constitute a, successful , Kuh-
nian revolution, by Pourciau’s standard. Indeed, Robinson [148, p. 271-
273] proposed an interpretation of Cauchy’s sum theorem that would
make it correct, in the context of an infinitesimal-enriched continuum,
see also J. Cleave [40], Cutland et al. [46], Goldblatt [80, p. 90], and
Br˚ating [32]. This (ongoing) project appears to be a striking realisation
of a reconstruction project enunciated by I. Grattan-Guinness, in the
name of Freudenthal [72]:
it is mere feedback-style ahistory to read Cauchy (and
contemporaries such as Bernard Bolzano) as if they had
read Weierstrass already. On the contrary, their own
pre-Weierstrassian muddles need historical reconstruc-
tion [85, p.176].93
6.2. A constructive glossary. As we already mentioned, Bishop’s
approach is rooted in Brouwer’s revolt against the non-constructive
nature of mathematics as practiced by his contemporaries.94
The Brouwer–Hilbert debate captured the popular mathematical
imagination in the 1920s. Brouwer’s crying call was for the elimina-
tion of most of the applications of LEM from meaningful mathemat-
ical discourse. Burgess discusses the debate briefly in his treatment
of nominalism in [37, p. 27]. We analyzed Bishop’s implementation of
Brouwer’s nominalistic project in [111].
Bishop’s program has met with a certain amount of success, and
attracted a number of followers. Part of the attraction stems from a
detailed lexicon developed by Bishop so as to challenge received (classi-
cal) views on the nature of mathematics. A constructive lexicon was a
sine qua non of his success. A number of terms from Bishop’s construc-
tivist lexicon constitute a novelty as far as intuitionism is concerned,
and are not necessarily familiar even to someone knowledgeable about
intuitionism per se. It may be helpful to provide a summary of such
terms for easy reference, arranged alphabetically, as follows.
93See Borovik & Katz [31] and Katz & Katz [112] for a detailed analysis of trends
in Cauchy historiography.
94Similar tendencies on the part of Wittgenstein were analyzed by H. Putnam,
who describes them as “minimalist” [143, p. 242]. See also G. Kreisel [82].
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• Debasement of meaning is the cardinal sin of the classical opposi-
tion, from Cantor to Keisler,95 committed with LEM (see below). The
term occurs in Bishop’s Schizophrenia [27] and Crisis [25] texts.
• Fundamentalist excluded thirdist is a term that refers to a classically-
trained mathematician who has not yet become sensitized to implicit
use of the law of excluded middle (i.e., excluded third) in his arguments,
see [145, p. 249].96
• Idealistic mathematics is the output of Platonist mathematical
sensibilities, abetted by a metaphysical faith in LEM (see below), and
characterized by the presence of merely a peculiar pragmatic content
(see below).
• Integer is the revealed source of all meaning (see below), posited
as an alternative foundation displacing both formal logic, axiomatic
set theory, and recursive function theory. The integers wondrously
escape97 the vigilant scrutiny of a constructivist intelligence determined
to uproot and nip in the bud each and every Platonist fancy of a concept
external to the mathematical mind.
In Bishop’s system, the integers are uppermost to the exclusion of
the continuum. Bishop rejected Brouwer’s work on an intuitionstic
continuum in the following terms:
Brouwer’s bugaboo has been compulsive speculation about
the nature of the continuum. His fear seems to have been
that, unless he personally intervened to prevent it, the
continuum would turn out to be discrete. [The result
was Brouwer’s] semimystical theory of the continuum
[23, p. 6 and 10].
• Integrity is perhaps one of the most misunderstood terms in Errett
Bishop’s lexicon. Pourciau in his Education [141] appears to interpret
it as an indictment of the ethics of the classical opposition. Yet in his
Schizophrenia text, Bishop merely muses:
I keep coming back to the term “integrity”. [27, p. 4]
95But see footnote 103.
96This use of the term “fundamentalist excluded thirdist” is in a text by Rich-
man, not Bishop. I have not been able to source its occurrence in Bishop’s writing.
In a similar vein, an ultrafinitist recently described this writer as a “choirboy of
infinitesimology”; however, this term does not seem to be in general use. See also
Subsections 114 and 8.1.
97By dint of a familiar oracular quotation from Kronecker; see also main text
around footnote 48.
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Note that the period is in the original. Bishop describes integrity as
the opposite of a syndrome he colorfully refers to as schizophrenia,
characterized by a number of ills, including
(a) a rejection of common sense in favor of formalism,
(b) the debasement of meaning (see above),
(c) as well as by a list of other ills—
but excluding dishonesty. Now the root of
integr-ity
is identical with that of integer (see above), the Bishopian ultimate
foundation of analysis. Bishop’s evocation of integrity may have been
an innocent pun intended to allude to a healthy constructivist mindset,
where the integers are uppermost.
Brouwer sought to incorporate a theory of the continuum as part
of intuitionistic mathematics, by means of his free choice sequences.
Bishop’s commitment to integr-ity is thus a departure from Brouwerian
intuitionism.
• Law of excluded middle (LEM) is the main source of the non-
constructivities of classical mathematics.98 Every formalisation of in-
tuitionistic logic excludes LEM ; adding LEM back again returns us to
classical logic.
• Limited principle of omniscience (LPO) is a weak form of LEM
(see above), involving LEM -like oracular abilities limited to the context
of integer sequences.99 The LPO is still unacceptable to a construc-
tivist, but could have served as a basis for a meaningful dialog between
Brouwer and Hilbert (see [25]), that could allegedly have changed the
course of 20th century mathematics.
• Meaning is a favorite philosophic term in Bishop’s lexicon, neces-
sarily preceding an investigation of truth in any coherent discussion.
In Bishop’s writing, the term meaning is routinely conflated with nu-
merical meaning (see below).
• Numerical meaning is the content of a theorem admitting a proof
based on intuitionistic logic, and expressing computationally meaning-
ful facts about the integers.100 The conflation of numerical meaning
with meaning par excellence in Bishop’s writing, has the following two
consequences:
98See Example 2.1.
99See Subsection 3.1 for a discussion of LPO.
100As an illustration, a numerically meaningful proof of the irrationality of
√
2
appears in Example 2.1.
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(1) it empowers the constructivist to sweep under the rug the dis-
tinction between pre-LEM and post-LEM numerical meaning,101
lending a marginal degree of plausibility to a dismissal of clas-
sical theorems which otherwise appear eminently coherent and
meaningful;102 and
(2) it allows the constructivist to enlist the support of anti-realist
philosophical schools of thought (e.g. Michael Dummett) in the
theory of meaning, inspite of the apparent tension with Bishop’s
otherwise realist declarations (see entry Realistic mathematics
below).
• Peculiar pragmatic content is an expression of Bishop’s [23, p. viii]
that was analyzed by Billinge [21, p. 179]. It connotes an alleged lack
of empirical validity of classical mathematics, when classical results
are merely inference tickets [21, p. 180] used in the deduction of other
mathematical results.
• Realistic mathematics . The dichotomy of “realist” versus “ideal-
ist” (see above) is the dichotomy of “constructive” versus “classical”
mathematics, in Bishop’s lexicon. There are two main narratives of the
Intuitionist insurrection, one anti-realist and one realist . The issue is
discussed in Subsections 6.3 and 6.4.
On the first page of his book, Bishop claims that constructive mathe-
matics based on the natural numbers will still be the same, “in another
universe, with another biology and another physics” [23, p. 1]. Since
the sensory perceptions of the human body are physics- and chemistry-
bound, a claim of such trans-universe invariance amounts to the posit-
ing of a disembodied nature of the natural number system (transcending
the physics and the chemistry). Bishop’s disembodied natural numbers
are the cornerstone of his approach.
6.3. Insurrection according to Michael. The anti-realist narra-
tive, mainly following Michael Dummett [60], traces the original sin
of classical mathematics with LEM , all the way back to Aristotle.103
The law of excluded middle (see Subsection 6.2) is the mathematical
counterpart of geocentric cosmology (alternatively, of phlogiston, see
101See Subsection 5.2.
102See Subsection 4.3 for a discussion of the extreme value theorem in an intu-
itionstic context.
103the entry under debasement of meaning in Subsection 6.2 would read, ac-
cordingly, “the classical opposition from Aristotle to Keisler”; see main text at
footnote 95.
52 KARIN USADI KATZ AND M. KATZ
Subsection 6.1), slated for the dustbin of history.104 The anti-realist
narrative dismisses the Quine-Putnam indispesability thesis (see Sub-
section 8.2), on the grounds that a philosophy-first examination of first
principles is the unique authority empowered to determine the correct
way of doing mathematics.105 Generally speaking, it is this narrative
that seems to be favored by a number of philosophers of mathematics.
Dummett opposes a truth-valued, bivalent semantics, namely the
notion that truth is one thing and knowability another, on the grounds
that it violates Dummett’smanifestation requirement , see Shapiro [160,
p. 54]. The latter requirement, in the context of mathematics, is a re-
statement of the intuitionistic principle that truth is tantamount to
verifiability. Thus, an acceptance of Dummett’s manifestation require-
ment, leads to intuitionistic semantics and a rejection of LEM.
In his foundational text [59] originating from 1973 lecture notes,
Dummett is frank about the source of his interest in the intuition-
ist/classical dispute in mathematics:
This dispute bears a strong resemblance to other
disputes over realism of one kind or another, that is,
concerning various kinds of subject-matter (or types of
statement), including that over realism about the phys-
ical universe106 [59, p. ix] [emphasis added–authors].
What Dummett proceeds to say at this point, reveals the nature of his
interest:
but intuitionism represents the only sustained attempt
by the opponents of a realist view to work out a coher-
ent embodiment of their philosophical beliefs [emphasis
added–authors].
What interests Dummett here is the fight against the realist view .
What endears intuitionists to him, is the fact that they have succeeded
where the phenomenalists have not:
Phenomenalists might have attained a greater success if
they had made a remotely comparable effort to show in
detail what consequences their interpretation of material-
object statements would have for our employment of our
language [59, p. ix].
104Following Kronecker and Brouwer, Dummett rejects actual infinity, at vari-
ance with Bishop.
105See discussion of the views of Billinge and Hellman in the main text at foot-
note 79.
106The strong resemblance claim is precisely the point we wish to dispute, see
below.
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However, Dummett’s conflation of the mathematical debate and the
philosophical debate, could be challenged.
We hereby explicitly sidestep the debate opposing the realist (as
opposed to the super-realist, see W. Tait [171]) position and the anti-
realist position. On the other hand, we observe that a defense of in-
dispensability of mathematics would necessarily start by challenging
Dummett’s manifestation requirement. More precisely, such a defense
would have to start by challenging the extension of Dummett’s man-
ifestation requirement, from the realm of philosophy to the realm of
mathematics. While Dummett chooses to pin the opposition to intu-
itionism, to a belief in an
interpretation of mathematical statements as referring
to an independently existing and objective reality [59,
p. ix],
(i.e. a Platonic world of mathematical entities), J. Avigad memorably
retorts as follows:
We do not need fairy tales about numbers and triangles
prancing about in the realm of the abstracta [8].
A. Weir writes that Dummett’s argument hinges on questionable em-
piricist dogma:
Dummett claims that no teacher could manifest and
communicate to a pupil, about to acquire a language,
grasp of sentences which are determinately true or false
though we may be incapable of determining which. But
the argument seems to hinge on the empiricist dogma
that what is learned cannot radically transcend the ex-
periential or stimulatory inputs to learning [186, p. 465].
6.4. Insurrection according to Errett. Turning now to the realist
narrative of the intuitionist insurrection, we note that such a narrative
appears to be more consistent with what Bishop himself actually wrote.
In his foundational essay, Bishop expresses his position as follows:
As pure mathematicians, we must decide whether we
are playing a game, or whether our theorems describe
an external reality.107 [25, p. 507].
The right answer, to Bishop, is that they do describe an external real-
ity.108 The dichotomy of “realist” versus “idealist” is the dichotomy of
107This remark of Bishop’s has been reflected in secondary sources; see [47,
p. 188].
108Our purpose here is not to endorse or refute Bishop’s views on this point, but
rather to document his actual position, which appears to diverge from Dummett’s.
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“constructive” versus “classical” mathematics, in Bishop’s lexicon (see
entry under idealistic mathematics in Section 6.2). In [27, p. 4], Bishop
mentions his ambition to incorporate such mathematically oriented dis-
ciplines as physics as part of his constructive revolution, revealing a
recognition, on his part, of the potency of the Quine-Putnam indis-
pensability challenge.109
N. Kopell and G. Stolzenberg, close associates of Bishop, published
a three-page Commentary [123] following Bishop’s Crisis text. Their
note places the original sin with LEM at around 1870 (rather than
Greek antiquity), when the “flourishing empirico-inductive tradition”
began to be replaced by the “strictly logico-deductive conception of
pure mathematics”.110 Kopell and Stolzenberg don’t hesitate to com-
pare the empirico-deductive tradition in mathematics, to physics, in
the following terms:
[Mathematical] theories were theories about the phe-
nomena, just as in a physical theory [123, p. 519].
Similar views have been expressed by D. Bridges, see e.g. [36], and, as
we argue in Subsection 7.2, by Heyting.
6.5. Richman on large cardinals. The Interview with a constructive
mathematician was published by leading constructivist F. Richman in
1996. In the Interview , Richman seems to reject any alternative to an
anti-LEM constructivism, in his very first comment:
the constructive mathematician dismisses classical math-
ematics as an exercise in formal logic, much like inves-
tigating the consequences of large cardinal axioms [145,
p. 248].
It should be noted that fellow constructivist D. Bridges [35] appears
to distance himself somewhat from Richman’s Interview , which he de-
scribed in 1997 as
a fascinating, provocative, and by no means standard
view on constructivism in mathematics.111
109Billinge [20, p. 314] purports to detect “inchoate” anti-realist views in Bishop’s
writings, but provides no constructive proof of their existence, other than a pair
quotes on numerical meaning. Meanwhile, Hellman writes: “Some of Bishop’s
remarks (1967) suggest that his position belongs in [the radical] category” [95,
p. 222].
110The latter term may be referring to the Fregean revolution in logic, see foot-
note 116.
111Philosophers of science such as Hellman (see [95, p. 222]) and Billinge see
Brigdes as being closer to the liberal outlook, and further from the radical one,
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In the context of the exchange between Class and Int (see Subsec-
tion 7.2), note that Richman seems to concede a point to Class in
the following group theory remark, somewhat parallel to our Pappus
analogy112 in Section 7.2:
The richness of constructive mathematics lies in the fact
that concepts that are equivalent in the presence of the
law of excluded middle, need not be equivalent. This is
typical of generalizations: the notion of a normal sub-
group is equivalent to that of a subgroup in the context
of the commutative law [145, p. 257].
Yet he quickly retreats to the safety of anti-LEM, observing that
the law of excluded middle obliterates the notion of pos-
itive content [. . . ]
Anti-LEM constructivist examination of the foundations is typically
laced with anti-theological sarcasm, as when a mainstream mathemati-
cian is described as “a fundamentalist excluded-thirdist” [145, p. 249]
(see [145, p. 260] for additional deistic sarcasm), betraying a nonnego-
tiable commitment to an ideology.113 Yet we detect a glimmer of hope
here, when Richman writes:
It now seems apparent to me–although I did not real-
ize this for many years–that for all practical purposes,
constructive mathematics coincides with mathematics
done in the context of intuitionistic logic [145, p. 253]
[emphasis added–authors].
While little evidence is offered for such a counter-intuitive (no pun
intended) assertion, it sets out the following hope. If a numerical con-
structivist can, after many years , be led to abandon numerical con-
structivism and switch to anti-LEM; then also, at some future time,
anti-LEM constructivists can perhaps be persuaded, by force of over-
whelming evidence, to abandon anti-LEM and switch to numerical con-
structivism of the companion variety. The nature of such evidence will
be discussed below.
than Richman, whether or not Bridges meant this comment as a way of distancing
himself from Richman.
112See discussion at footnote 119.
113Whether or not Richman meant this comment to be tongue-in-cheek, con-
structivists are merely following Bishop’s sarcastic lead, see [23, p. 2] as well as
Bishop’s “diabolical” limerick entitled Formalism, characterizing the latter as “saw-
dust”, while constructivism as “the heart” [27, p. 14].
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Richman’s disillusionment with classical mathematics was triggered
by a perceived lack of meaning in uncountable, torsion abelian group
theory. Richman writes that, even in the countable case,
the centerpiece of the subject, the classification theo-
rem for countable torsion abelian groups, cannot even
be stated without ordinal numbers [144].
To Richman, the non-constructivity of the arguments appears to be
compounded by the non-constructive formulation of the very state-
ments of the results of torsion abelian group theory. Richman ap-
parently perceived a lack of numerical meaning of even the post-LEM
kind, as discussed in Subsection 5.2. If Richman’s disillusionment with
classical mathematics was predicated on a conflation of the two types
of numerical meaning, then it leaves open the possibility for other con-
structivists to sympathize with Richman’s disillusionment with tor-
sion abelian groups, without, however, jettisoning post-LEM numerical
meaning of classical mathematics.114
What is the nature of the evidence in favor of a numerical con-
structivism of a companion variety? A mathematician working in the
tradition of Archimedes, Leibniz, and Cauchy owes at least a residual
allegiance to the idea that the most important mathematical problems
are those coming from physics, engineering, and science more generally.
A mathematical theory that has wide-ranging applications, be it Abra-
ham Robinson’s infinitesimals or Alain Connes’ infinitesimals,115 is not
114See also footnote 81.
115A. Connes criticizes Robinson’s infinitesimals for being dependent on non-
constructive foundational material. He further claims it to be a weakness of Robin-
son’s infinitesimals that the results of calculations that employ them, do not depend
on the choice of the infinitesimal. Yet, Connes himself develops a theory of infinites-
imals bearing a striking similarity to the ultrapower construction of the hyperreals.
Furthermore, he freely relies on such results as the existence of the Dixmier trace,
and the Hahn-Banach theorem. The latter results rely on similarly nonconstructive
foundational material. Connes claims the independence of the choice of Dixmier
trace to be a strength of his theory of infinitesimals in [42, p. 6213]. Thus, both of
Connes’ criticisms apply to his own theory of infinitesimals. As far as the introduc-
tion of non-commutativity by Connes is concerned, it is similar to the enlargement
from the diagonal matrices, to the spectrum of arbitrary symmetric matrices. Such
an enlargement is a natural generalisation. Its commutative antecedent cannot be
criticized for commutativity, any more than one can criticize the Cartan subalgebra
of, say, a matrix algebra, for being abelian. The mathematical novelty of Connes’
theory of infinitesimals resides in the exploitation of Dixmier’s trace, relying as it
does on non-constructive foundatoinal material, thus of similar foundational status
to, for instance, the ultrapower construction of a non-Archimedean extension of the
reals. See also Example 5.5 above.
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easily discounted as meaningless, even if its starting point may rely
on foundational material that is not fully constructive. This thread is
pursued in more detail in Section 8.
7. Is constructive mathematics part of classical
mathematics?
7.1. From Cantor and Frege to Brouwer. W. Tait [170] argues
that, unlike intuitionism, constructive mathematics is part of classical
mathematics. We would like to go further, and suggest that Frege’s rev-
olutionary logic (see Gillies [75]) and Cantor’s revolutionary set theory
(see Dauben [48]) created a new language and a new paradigm, trans-
forming mathematical foundations into fair game for further investiga-
tion, experimentation, and criticism, including intuitionistic criticism
voiced by Brouwer.116
Classical mathematics as pursued by Frege and Cantor literally cre-
ated a universe of discourse where Brouwer’s insurrectional narrative
could be articulated and enjoy a hearing. In this sense, intuitionism
is not a rival, but an offspring, of classical mathematics. To quote
J. Avigad,
[t]he syntactic, axiomatic standpoint has enabled us to
fashion formal representations of various foundational
stances, and we now have informative descriptions of the
types of reasoning that are justified on finitist, predica-
tive, constructive, intuitionistic, structuralist, and clas-
sical grounds [8].
This idea, as applied to intuitionism, was expressed by J. Gray in the
following terms:
Intuitionistic logics were developed incorporating the
logical strictures of Brouwer; constructivist mathemat-
ics still enjoys a certain vogue. But these are somehow
116Cantor’s set theory is familiar to a general mathematical audience, and re-
quires no special comment. The revolutionary nature of Frege’s work from 1879,
cf. [71], is widely known in logic and philosophy circles. To summarize Gillies’ the-
sis, the Fregean revolution in logic was a change from the Aristotelian paradigm:
the theory of syllogism was replaced by propositional calculus and first-order pred-
icate calculus. The basis for the logical notation we today take for granted was in
fact laid by Frege, under the name Begriffsschrift , ‘conceptual notation’. (Frege
himself used a 2-dimensional notation that has not been accepted by logicians, who
have given preference to a linear notation more along the lines of Peano, who was
strongly influenced by Frege.) For a fascinating account of the genesis of the Be-
griffsschrift in Frege’s ‘Logicist program’ of showing that the truths of arithmetic
are analytic (rather than synthetic), see Gillies [75, p. 288].
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contained within the larger framework of modern
mathematics.117 [87, p. 242] [emphasis added–authors].
In a similar vein, no less an authority than M. Heidegger wrote (al-
most simultaneously with Kolmogorov quoted in Subsection 2.2) as
follows:
The level which a science has reached is deter-
mined by how far it is capable of a crisis in its basic
concepts [92, p. 29-30] [emphasis added–authors].
Lest one should doubt whether Heidegger meant for his comments to
apply to mathematics, he continues:
Mathematics , which is seemingly the most rigorous and
most firmly constructed of the sciences, has reached a
crisis in its ‘foundations’.
Lest one should doubt whether he had Brouwer in mind, Heidegger
continues:
In the controversy between the formalists and the in-
tuitionists, the issue is one of obtaining and securing
the primary way of access to what are supposedly the
objects of this science [emphasis added–authors].
What Heidegger appears to be saying is that if we take the supposed
objects to be sets or integers, the issue becomes whether a primary way
of accessing them is provided by the law of excluded middle. Our in-
terest in Heidegger’s remarks stems from his observation that a science
capable of such a foundational crisis, had necessarily reached an ap-
propriate level of maturity, which we attribute to earlier developments
due to Frege (via Peano), Cantor, and others.
7.2. Heyting’s good right. A. Heyting gave the first formal devel-
opment of intuitionistic logic in order to codify Brouwer’s way of doing
mathematics. Yet, we will show that Heyting unequivocally sides with
the view of intuitionism as a companion, rather than alternative, to
classical mathematics (see also Subsection 7.3). Heyting’s example
shows that a concern over the non-constructivity of the widespead use
of the law of excluded middle in classical mathematics, need not neces-
sarily lead to a radical position expressed in some of Bishop’s writing.
117Gray concludes with the following thought on current debates in the founda-
tions of mathematics: “either they are technical and accessible only to logicians,
or they are epistemological and draw their examples from concepts we meet in
school”. Examples going beyond the concepts we meet in school are discussed in
Subsections 5.2 and 8.4.
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A. Heyting’s book Intuitionism [101] dates from 1956. The (first
part of the) book is written in the form of a dialog among represen-
tatives of some of the main schools of thought in the foundations of
mathematics. We will now analyze Heyting’s comments in more detail.
The protagonist named Class makes the following point:
Intuitionism should be studied as part of mathemat-
ics. In mathematics, we study consequences of given
hypotheses. The hypotheses assumed by intuitionists
may in fact be interesting, but they have no right to a
monopoly [101, p .4] [emphasis added–authors].
In other words, emptying our logical toolkit of the law of excluded
middle is one possible foundational framework among others.118 This
could be compared, for example, to studying projective geometry with
Pappus’ axiom eliminated.119 Class ’s claim appears to be accepted by
the protagonist Int . Consider Int’s response to Class ’s remarks:
Nor do we claim that; we [i.e., intuitionists] are content
if you admit the good right of our conception [emphasis
added–authors].
In this connection, S. Shapiro notes:
The later Heyting did not claim a “monopoly” on math-
ematics, and would rest content if the classical mathe-
matician “admits the good right of” the intuitionistic
conception [160, p. 55-56].
One can legitimately pose the question whether Int is merely being
polite in his response to Class . Note that later on in the same chapter,
Int concedes that intuitionism has few applications, and compares it
to “history, art, and light entertainment” [101, p. 10]. He does this,
obviously, not as a way of disparaging intuitionism, but as a way of
underscoring its intrinsic value as an intellectual pursuit, as distinct
from a scientific pursuit. P. Maddy claims that
Heyting [. . . ] is happy to dismiss120 the loss of non-
constructive mathematics as ‘the excision of noxious or-
naments’ [128, pp. 1121-1122],
but a closer examination of Heyting’s remark [101, p. 11] reveals a more
nuanced picture. Here Int is responding to Form’s charge to the effect
that constructivists
118See footnote 16 on the non-uniqueness of intuitionistic logic.
119A related point in the context of group theory is made by F. Richman [145],
see Subsection 6.5.
120We saw above that Shapiro clearly disagrees with Maddy on this point.
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destroy the most precious mathematical results [101,
p. 10].
Int replies as follows:
As to the mutilation of mathematics of which you ac-
cuse me, it must be taken as an inevitable consequence
of our standpoint. It can also be seen as an excision
of noxious ornaments, [. . . ] and it is at least partly
compensated for by the charm of subtle distinctions
and witty methods by which intuitionists have enriched
mathematical thought [emphasis added–authors].
His comments show a clear recognition of the potency of the mutilation
challenge, as well as a necessity to compensate for the damages.
Heyting’s position is not inconsistent with a numerical construc-
tivism, as opposed to an anti-LEM constructivism, a kind of a long
march through the foundations launched in sixty-seven [23]. Heyting
was able to, so to speak, rise above differences of Class and Int .
What would Heyting have thought of a rigorous justification of in-
finitesimals in the framework of classical logic? Remarkably, we have
a detailed testimony by Heyting himself as to the respect he bore for
Robinson’s accomplishment, see Subsection 7.3. Already in 1956, Heyt-
ing allowed his protagonist Form to cite a reference by A. Robinson
[146] in a comment dealing with
the use of metamathematics for the deduction of math-
ematical results [101, p. 45].
In fact, in 1973, Heyting compared Robinson’s work favorably with
that of Brouwer himself, according to a Math Reviews summary:
[Heyting] gives a brief description of the nature of Robin-
son’s work in model theory and reflects on how that work
resembles that of Brouwer and thereby qualifies for the
award of the Brouwer medal [102].
S. Shapiro [160], in a retort to N. Tennant [178], unveils an allegedly
irreducible clash between classical mathematics, on the one hand, and
intuitionism as expressed through Heyting’s semantics, on the other.
Here Heyting semantics refers to the constructive interpretation of the
quantifiers discussed in Subsection 2.3. Shapiro writes as follows:
Let χ(x) be any predicate that applies to natural num-
bers. It is a routine theorem of classical arithmetic that
∀x∃!y [(χ(x) ∧ y = 0) ∨ (¬χ(x) ∧ y = 1)]
(Shapiro [160, p. 60]).
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Classically, Shapiro’s formula merely asserts that χ(x) is either true
or false (where y is assigned respectively the value 0 or 1). Shapiro
continues:
Under Heyting semantics, this proof amounts to a the-
sis that there is a computable function that decides
whether χ holds. So under Heyting semantics [. . . ] ev-
ery predicate is effectively decidable[, which is] a tough
pull to swallow and keep down.121
Namely, the constructive existence of y necessarily entails being able
to find a computational procedure capable of identifying such a y as a
function of x, and hence a decision procedure for the predicate χ.
Does this prove that classical mathematics and intuitionism cannot
get along , as Shapiro puts it? Yes , if by “classical mathematics” is
meant “all of classical mathematics”, down to the very last predicate.
On the other hand, the answer is no, if we are to adopt Bishop’s 1975
program [25], involving a comprehensive sifting of classical material.
In fact, the philosophical exchange between Tennant and Shapiro has
an uncanny parallel—a quarter century earlier, in the exchange between
Bishop and Timothy G. McCarthy, writing for Math Reviews [132] in
1975. In the context of Bishop’s proposal to translate absolute classical
statements into relative assertions of the form “LPO→such-and-such”,
McCarthy writes as follows:
There is an ambiguity about just what the author in-
tends to explicate by means of the suggested transla-
tion. It is not plausible to suppose that A is classically
true (false) if and only if [the proposition] LPO → A
([respectively,] LPO → ¬A) is constructively provable,
in view of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem.
It appears that Bishop’s intention was not to capture all classical state-
ments, but rather to undertake a comprehensive sift. Such seems to be
the position adopted by the mature Heyting, as well, as we analyze in
the next section.
7.3. Heyting’s Address to Professor Robinson. Intuitionist Heyt-
ing’s comments in Address to Professor A. Robinson [102] are fascinat-
ing and worth reproducing in some detail:
121A similar argument involving the introduction of an auxiliary bivalent variable
occurs in the proof of the Goodman-Myhill theorem, see footnote 74.
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(1) (p. 135) Brouwer was right that intuitionistic mathematics is
the only form of mathematics which has a perfectly clear inter-
pretation [. . . ] and it is desirable that as much of mathematics
as possible will be made constructive.
(2) (ibid.) the curious mixture of formal reasoning and more or
less vague intuitions which classical mathematics is, remains an
imposing work of art and [at] the same time the powerful tool
in the struggle for life of mankind.122
(3) (ibid.) intuitionistic mathematics is no longer isolated from
classical mathematics [emphasis added–authors].
(4) (ibid.) several mathematicians work on the foundations of in-
tuitionistic as well as of classical mathematics.
(5) (ibid.) The two subjects become more and more intertwined.
In a remarkable tribute to Robinson’s oeuvre, Heyting writes:
In your work on the metamathematics of algebra you
explored systematically the connections between formal
logic and algebra, firstly in the form of so-called trans-
fer principles, by which a theorem, proved for some
algebraic system, holds automatically for a whole class
of such systems [102, p. 135] [emphasis added–authors].
For a discussion of the transfer principle of non-standard analysis, see
Appendix A. Heyting does not stop there, and makes the following
additional points:
(1) (p. 136) the creation of non-standard analysis is a standard
model of important mathematical research.
(2) (ibid.) you connected this extremely abstract part of model
theory with a theory apparently so far apart as the elementary
calculus [emphasis added–authors].
(3) (ibid.) In doing so you threw new light on the history of the
calculus by giving a clear sense to Leibniz’s notion of infinites-
imals.
(4) (ibid.) infinitesimals [. . . ] are still commonly used in many
fields where their elimination [. . . ] would lead to unwelcome
complications.
(5) (ibid.) This is the case in differential geometry and in many
parts of applied mathematics such as hydrodynamics and elec-
tricity theory, where physicists use infinitesimals without a twinge
of conscience.
122The curious mixture was the subject of Crowe’s musings cited in the main
text preceding footnote 10.
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(6) (ibid.) You showed how these theories can be made precise by
your method. Dirac’s δ-function is an extreme example. This
mysterious object became lucid in the light of non-archimedean
analysis123 [emphasis added–authors].
On the subject of whether there is meaning after model theory, Heyt-
ing has this to say:
(1) (p. 136) The notion of a non-standard model is complicated and
highly inconstructive [sic], but its properties, though surprising,
are rather simple and can therefore be understood by people
who know very little about model theory;
(2) (ibid.) Once you had shown by the paradigm of the calculus
how it can be used, many other applications were found by
yourself as well as by many other mathematicians.
(3) (p. 137) Model theory was in our time one of the abstract the-
ories which, so to say, floated in the air. In a sense your work
can be considered as a return from this abstraction to concrete
applications [emphasis added–authors].
(4) (ibid.) The general non-constructive theory of non-standard
models links its applications together into a harmoni[ous] whole.
Heyting’s final comment is particularly revealing. He recognizes that,
while the model may be non-constructive, its applications may indeed
be concrete (in the terminology of Subsection 5.2, such applications
possess post-LEM numerical meaning). Such a thesis is consonant with
what we called numerical constructivism in Subsection 5.1.
In Heyting’s case, an acute awareness of the shortcomings of LEM-
dependent mathematical investigations went hand-in-hand with an ap-
preciation of the accomplishments of classical mathematics in general,
and Robinson’s mathematics in particular. Such an awareness is there-
fore not at odds with a recognition of the coherence of post-LEM nu-
merical meaning. It is at odds, however, with an anti-LEM radical
constructivist stance, as enunciated by E. Bishop.
8. Constructivism, physics, and the real world
In this section we deal with challenges to anti-LEM constructivism
stemming from natural science.
8.1. Bishop’s view. Bishop [27, p. 4] speaks in favor of a goal of
seeking
123Infinitesimal constructions of “Dirac” delta functions originate with Fourier
and Cauchy, see Borovik & Katz [31].
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common ground in the researches of pure mathematics,
applied mathematics, and such mathematically oriented
disciplines as physics [. . . ] [emphasis added–authors].
To what extent is such a commendable goal served well by construc-
tivism?
In the previous section, we mentioned the constructivist’s problem
of accounting for applications of LEM-dominated mathematics. This
point seems to have bothered the interviewer of Richman’s Interview :
Here is a question that has bothered me ever since the
first time I read Bishop. In what sense can your [con-
structive] real line be used as a model for either space
or time in physics? [145, p. 252]
Richman replies as follows:
I don’t know exactly how to respond to the [. . . ] ques-
tion, given that I have already rejected the idea that
constructivists have a real line that is different from the
classical real line.
It needs to be understood what Richman meant by this cryptic re-
mark. For convenience, we will discuss the circle R/Z instead of R
itself. The circle R/Z is constructively diffeomorphic (via the expo-
nential map) to the unit circle in the plane. A classical mathematician
believes that the circle can be decomposed as the disjoint union of the
lower halfcircle (with one endpoint included, and the other excluded)
and its antipodal image (upper halfcircle). Meanwhile, the construc-
tivist believes that it is impossible to decompose the circle as the dis-
joint union of a pair of antipodal sets. Aren’t these different lines? In
a similar vein, a typical physicist possesses a simple faith in the ex-
istence of infinitesimals in our familiar number system, and Komkov
[121] explicitly endorses Robinson’s infinitesimals. As we have docu-
mented in the present text, Bishop and his followers are less eager to
accept Robinson’s infinitesimals as part of our number system. Aren’t
these different “real lines”?
At any rate, Richman’s reply above124 does not appear to deal with
the issue of scientific applications as a litmus test of the relevance
124Now an anti-LEM constructivist may be satisfied with a dodge, but the rest of
us may wonder why Richman’s 24-page Interview has no bibliography, particularly
in view of its publication in a journal that describes itself as “an organ for rapid,
low-cost, communication between historians of logic and research logicians”. Did
history start with E. Bishop?
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of mathematical production. Such an issue is related to the Quine-
Putnam indispensability thesis , see Feferman [66, Section IIB], M. Coly-
van [41], or G. Hellman [94], see Subsection 8.2 below.
In fact, Bishop himself was challenged on the relationship to physics
by G. Mackey, in the following terms:
Consider the foundational question in physics: what is
the real mathematics that the physicists are doing? [25,
p. 515]
In his reply, Bishop falls back on the issue of mathematical rigor:
physicists have told me that the sort of meaning that is
appropriate to physics is not to ask whether the mathe-
matics in question is rigorous. Rather, it involves the re-
lation of the results to the real world [emphasis added–
authors].
At first glance, Bishop’s comment may seem to amount to an unob-
jectionable observation concerning a higher standard of rigor in math-
ematics. However, what Bishop is emphasizing in his essay is a notion
of meaning which amounts to, as Hellman puts it, a philosophical prin-
ciple of cognitive significance [96, p. 239]. Such a notion must, in
Bishop’s view [25, p. 509], supercede and precede a notion of truth, as
well as the related one of rigor .
The kind of (unabashedly LEM-dominated) mathematics that a physi-
cist practices is, as Bishop seems to admit matter-of-factly, successful in
relating to the real world , and therefore apparently meaningful . Such a
situation apparently creates a tension with Bishop’s attempted identi-
fication of meaning with numerical meaning , that can only be resolved
in the context of a numerical constructivism, a companion to classical
mathematics, recognizing the coherence of post-LEM numerical mean-
ing (see Subsection 5.2).
In his Constructivist manifesto, Bishop wrote that
Weyl, a great mathematician who in practice suppressed
his constructivist convictions, expressed the opinion that
idealistic [i.e. classical] mathematics finds its justifica-
tion in its applications in physics [23, p. 10].
Bishop does not elaborate as to why he feels H. Weyl was off the mark
here; this point will be discussed in Subsection 8.2.
8.2. Hellman on indispensability. The challenge to constructivism
stemming from the Quine-Putnam indispesability thesis has been ex-
tensively pursued by G. Hellman. Hellman expresses an appreciation of
the foundational significance of constructivism in the following terms:
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A turning point [. . . ] came in the 1960s with the ap-
pearance of Erret[t] Bishop’s Foundations of construc-
tive analysis (1967) which succeeded in constructivizing
large portions of classical functional analysis of just the
sort used in the physical sciences (including the theory
of operators on Banach and Hilbert spaces, and even
measure theory) [94, p. 457].
As to the question whether Bishop’s constructivism can ultimately
serve the needs of the natural sciences, Hellman analyzes what he sees
as limitations of constructivism in scientific applications. Hellman [95,
p. 234] invokes Plato’s parable of the cave, apparently reflecting his
global perception of constructivism as an intellectual house of cards.
However, one can recognize the coherence of the intuitionist critique of
the foundations of mathematics, while rejecting the intellectual under-
pinnings of its insurrectional narrative, in its mutually contradictory
(realist and anti-realist) versions, as discussed in Subsection 6.3.
In the context of general relativity theory, Hellman argues that, very
likely, the Hawking–Penrose singularity theorems for general relativistic
spacetimes are essentially non-constructive (Hellman in [98]), see also
(Billinge [20]), see Subsection 8.4.
The philosopher of mathematics M. Dummett rejects outright the
idea that “empirical discoveries” or applications should have any bear-
ing on the outcome of the debate opposing constructivism and classical
mathematics:
Intuitionists are engaged in the wholesale reconstruc-
tion of mathematics, not to accord with empirical dis-
coveries, not to obtain more fruitful applications, but
solely on the basis of philosophical views concerning
what mathematical statements are about and what they
mean [. . . ] intuitionism will never succeed in its battle
against rival, and more widely accepted, forms of math-
ematics unless it can win the philosophical battle [60,
p. viii] [emphasis added–authors].
The battle imagery is typical of the anti-realist type of insurrectional
narrative, already discussed in Subsection 6.3.
Meanwhile, the philosopher of mathematics G. Hellman holds, just
as categorically, that such a philosophy-first attempt is “doomed”.125
Awaiting the outcome of the philosophical battle, we note that Dum-
mett’s stated intuitionist position qualifies for the anti-LEM species.
125See footnote 79 for Hellman’s view.
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Figure 8.1. A shortest loop on a torus
More generally, variational problems tend to be resistant to efforts
at constructivizing, a point apparently acknowledged by Beeson when
he writes that
Calculus of variations is a vast and important field which
lies right on the frontier between constructive and non-
constructive mathematics [13, p. 22].
The problem is that the extreme value theorem is not available in the
absence of the law of excluded middle. The extreme value theorem is
at the foundation of the calculus of variations.
As concrete examples, one could mention general existence results
for geodesics, minimal surfaces, constant curvature mean surfaces, and
therefore soap films and soap bubbles. It seems implausible to argue
that existence results for soap films (referred to in the literature as
Plateau’s problem) are meaningless merely because they lack Bishop-
style numerical meaning.
Question 8.1. As a geometer, this writer would be interested in clar-
ifying the constructive status of the following phenomenon related to
Loewner’s torus theorem of Example 5.4 in Subsection 5.2. Consider
a rubber band “clasping” a torus in 3-space, and let it shrink to a
shortest position (see Figure 8.1). Classically, one has a description
of the resulting object in terms of a minimizing (possibly non-unique)
closed geodesic. Providing a constructive description is not immediate,
as it depends on general results of the calculus of variations, as already
described above. To what extent can the existence of a loop of least
length of Figure 8.1 be recaptured constructively? Pourciau’s Educa-
tion [141, p. 721] advocates us to “move from the simple to the less
simple”, but how plausible is it that such a loop could admit a simpler
68 KARIN USADI KATZ AND M. KATZ
description in terms of a statement about the integers , as advocated
by Integrity (see glossary in Subection 6.2)?
8.3. Novikov’s perspective. S. P. Novikov’s essay [138], in the “cri-
sis” tradition of Weyl [189] and Bishop [25], deals with the crisis in
the cooperation of physicists and mathematicians, in Russia and in the
West. What Novikov makes excruciatingly clear is the disastrous effect
of such a divorce on mathematics itself. The crucial role of variational
principles is made clear already on the first page of Novikov’s essay. A
broad range of subjects illustrating the symbiotic relationship between
the two fields can be found in Grattan-Guinness [86].
Grattan-Guinness emphasizes the role of analogies drawn from other
theories , in theory-building in both mathematics and the sciences.
From his viewpoint, the physicists that Novikov has in mind have been
going by the book (Grattan-Guinness’s book, at any rate), applying
mathematical machinery by analogy , outside its original domain of ap-
plicability, and doing so with great success (in terms of predicting ex-
periments, etc.); yet no theoretical justification for their calculations,
in terms of traditional mathematics, has followed. What is worse, the
gap is growing wider, according to Novikov. Traditional mathemat-
ical foundations, whether classical or intuitionist, are proving to be
inadequate for the job of accounting for the progress in physics. Ac-
cordingly, Novikov is critical of set-theoretic foundations, going as far
as criticizing Kolmogorov himself, for systematic efforts to introduce
a set-theoretic approach in secondary education. Foundational insur-
rections a` la Brouwer, Bishop, and Dummett (see Subsection 6.3) may
amount to irrelevant distractions, from Novikov’s viewpoint.
8.4. The Hawking–Penrose theorem. The Hawking–Penrose the-
orem in relativity theory has been the subject of something of a con-
troversy in its own right, see G. Hellman [98], H. Billinge [20], and
E. Davies [53]. Hellman argued that the Hawking–Penrose theorem is
an important result which very likely does not have a constructive ana-
log. As we explain below, Billinge’s criticism of Hellman’s argument
is based on conflating two separate issues (geodesic incompleteness, on
the one hand, and a hypothetical description of a “singularity”, on the
other), due to a mathematical error on her part.
Davies [53, p. 268] mentions the following points:
(1) “Hellman [98] [. . . ] showed that the Hawking–Penrose singu-
larity theorem is not constructively valid.”
(2) “the theorem has been extremely influential in the subject.”
(3) “It is embarrasssing for a radical constructivist [. . . ]”
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(4) “It remains extremely hard to say much about the nature of the
singularities [. . . ] It is very likely that if a detailed description
of the singularities becomes possible classically, that description
will also be constructively valid.”
We will return to Davies’ remarks after reviewing the relevant math-
ematical details.
The Hawking–Penrose singularity theorem can be thought of as a
semi-Riemannian analog of the Myers theorem [135]. The latter is a
result in Riemannian geometry. The result in question is a bound,
modulo a suitable geometric hypothesis on the Ricci curvature, on the
distance from a point to its conjugate locus. The traditional formula-
tion of the Myers theorem relies upon the concept of a geodesic and a
Jacobi field, both of which are solutions of variational problems. My-
ers found a bound on the distance along a geodesic γ, to the nearest
vanishing point, called a conjugate point , of a Jacobi field along γ.
Returning to the Lorenzian case, note that Penrose does not even
use the term singularity in formulating the result that came to be
known as the Hawking–Penrose theorem. Rather, what one claims is
the existence of a “past-endless geodesic [. . . ] which has finite length”
[140, p. 69]. The proof is indirect, i.e. a proof by contradiction. Penrose
describes one of the main ingredients in the proof as the Raychaudhuri
effect. The latter is discussed in [140, item 7.21, p. 63]. Penrose points
out that
[f]or manifolds with a positive definite metric, essen-
tially the same effect had been studied earlier by Myers
(Penrose [140, p. 64]).
Thus, the formulation of the Hawking–Penrose theorem in terms
of “singularities” is superfluous to its purely mathematical content,
namely the fact that space-time must be (time-like or null) geodesically
incomplete.
Note that there exist examples of compact Lorentz manifolds which
are geodesically incomplete [91]. Penrose places singularities in quota-
tion marks when he points out that
the physical implication of the theorem is that “singu-
larities” (i.e., causal geodesic incompleteness) would be
expected to arise whenever such a collapse takes place
[140, p. 71].
(Note the significant i.e.) Whether or not geodesic incompleteness of
space-time can be understood in terms of a suitable singular limiting
object, boundary, or hole, is a separate question (extensively discussed
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in the physics literature, see references cited in [184, p. 213]), not ger-
mane to the problem of the foundational status (classical or intuition-
ist) of the Hawking–Penrose theorem.
Furthermore, while a suitable bound on the Ricci curvature does al-
low one to prove the existence of limiting objects in a Riemannian con-
text (see Gromov [88, Theorem 5.3, p. 275]), such limiting objects are
known to be arbitrarily pathological in general, unless one imposes ad-
ditional geometric hypotheses (as in the Anderson-Cheeger theory [2],
[177]), or, alternatively, leaves the domain of differential geometry and
imposes conditions of algebraicity (which do not appear to be justified
physically) on the manifolds being studied.
Foundationally or otherwise, finding fault with the Hawking–Penrose
theorem for failing to describe a “singularity”, is akin to finding fault
with the Big Bang theory for failing to describe “what came before the
bang”.
Thus, Billinge’s objection to Hellman’s text [98], on the grounds of a
lack of a constructive description of the singularity (echoed in item (4)
above), does not appear to be based on a detailed understanding of the
mathematics. The following phrase appears in Billinge:
a spacetime is singular if it is timelike or null geodesi-
cally incomplete, that is, if it has at least one timelike
or null geodesic that has a point at which it comes to
an end [20, p. 308] [emphasis added–authors].
The words “that is” that we have boldfaced, apparently presented by
Billinge as a mathematical definition, constitute an elementary math-
ematical error. The spacetime in question does not contain geodesics
that “come to an end”, at any point of the spacetime. Rather, the
geodesics are, as Penrose puts it in [140, p. 69], past-endless of fi-
nite length, i.e. they run off to (negative) infinity in finite time (in the
Lorentzian case, there is no analogue of the Hopf-Rinow theorem). Nat-
urally, if one thinks of geodesics as running into some kind of a singular
“endpoint”, or barrier, in spacetime, one can easily develop an impres-
sion that the relation of geodesic incompleteness to “singularities” is
far more immediate than it really is.
Billinge’s main source for relativity is the textbook by Wald [184].
The textbook contains the following remarks, which express the dis-
tinction between singularity and geodesic incompleteness clearly:
it is extremely difficult to give a satisfactory general no-
tion of [a ‘singularity’]. We provide motivation for the
notion of timelike and null geodesic incompleteness as a
criterion for the presence of a singularity [. . . ] It is this
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criterion which is used in the singularity theorems [184,
p. 212].
Furthermore, on page 214, Wald clearly states that
[u]ntil a satisfactory definition can be produced, we must
abandon the notion of a singularity as a “place”.
Describing a singularity as a “place” is, of course, precisely what Billinge
did at [20, p. 308]. Such an error could have been written off as a mere
slip, were it not for the further evidence of insufficient background
presented above.
It should be mentioned that, at variance with Davies’ item (1) above,
Hellman never purported to prove that “the Hawking–Penrose singu-
larity theorem is not constructively valid”, but only that he finds this
“very likely”, based on the non-constructive nature of the proofs found
in the literature, and the general difficulties of accounting for the cal-
culus of variations constructively (in this case, accounting for geodesics
and Jacobi fields), as already discussed in Subsection 8.2.
N. Tennant, writing on Logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences ,
claims that
a constructivist version of a mathematical theory is ad-
equate for all the applications to be made of the theory
within natural science [179, p. 1145].
Tennant claims that such a constructivist version is adequate for ap-
plications. Or perhaps it isn’t? Tennant’s claim apparently flies in the
face of everything we have written here. In fact, Tennant’s claim is not
substantiated in his article. Tennant continues by explaining that
to be able to produce all possible refutations of em-
pirical theories, the underlying logic can [. . . ] be taken
very weak [179, p. 1146] [emphasis added–authors].
Furthermore he concedes:
Nor do we intend to say anything about confirmation or
probabilification of hypotheses by evidence [179, p. 1149].
The evidence furnished by astrophysical observation tends to confirm
the hypotheses of the Hawking–Penrose theorem, but Tennant’s frame-
work does not deal with this type of scientific insight.
It is possible that, should further empirical observations one day
undermine the premises of the Hawking–Penrose theorem, the result-
ing refutation may turn out to be adequately expressible in Tennant’s
version of intuitionistic logic (this does not quite follow from [179] as
Tennant limits the discussion to first order logic). However, this does
not alter the fact that expressing the Hawking–Penrose theorem (let
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alone proving it) remains an elusive goal, intuitionistically speaking,
with the attendant loss of scientific insight provided by the theorem.
The Hawking–Penrose theorem, described by Davies as extremely
influential (see item (2) above), remains a challenge to Bishopian con-
structivism (see item (3) above), as do the numerous variational prin-
ciples mentioned by Novikov [138], see also Grattan-Guinness [86].
9. Epilogue
In 1973, Robinson delivered the Brouwer memorial lecture [150] on
the subject of Standard and nonstandard number systems .126 J. Dauben
quotes Robinson as follows:
Brouwer’s intuitionism is closely related to his concep-
tion of mathematics as a dynamic activity of the hu-
man intellect [. . . ] This is a conception for which I
have some sympathy and which, I believe, is acceptable
to many mathematicians who are not intuitionists [50,
p. 461] [emphasis added–authors].
Robinson concludes that
the dynamic evolution of mathematics is an ongoing pro-
cess not only at the summit [. . . ] but also at the more
basic level of our number systems, which [tomorrow]
may seem as eternal to a new generation as yesterday’s
technological innovations are in the eyes of a child of
today.
Have today’s constructivists been faithful to a conception of math-
ematics as a dynamic activity , as Robinson puts it? We would like
to suggest that the possibility of bridging the gap between construc-
tivism and non-standard analysis (as well as, indeed, the rest of clas-
sical mathematics) can be analyzed in the context of the dichotomy
of a numerical constructivism versus an anti-LEM constructivism (see
Section 5.1). Namely, only the former, consistent with Heyting’s brand
of intuitionism, seems sufficiently dynamic to answer the hopes [158]
of reuniting the antipodes .
Appendix A. Rival continua
A Leibnizian definition of the derivative as the infinitesimal quotient
∆y
∆x
,
126See Heyting’s introduction, quoted at length in Subsection 7.3.
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st

B-continuum
A-continuum
Figure A.1. Thick-to-thin: taking standard part (the
thickness of the top line is merely conventional)
whose logical weakness was criticized by Berkeley, was modified by
A. Robinson by exploiting a map called the standard part , denoted “st”,
from the finite part of a B-continuum (for “Bernoullian”), to the A-
continuum (for “Archimedean”), as illustrated in Figure A.1.
We will denote such a B-continuum by the new symbol IIR. We
will also denote its finite part, by
IIR<∞ = {x ∈ IIR : |x| <∞} ,
so that we have a disjoint union IIR = IIR<∞∪ IIR∞, where IIR∞ denotes
the set of inverses of nonzero infinitesimals.
The map “st” sends each finite point x ∈ IIR, to the real point
st(x) ∈ R infinitely close to x:
IIR<∞
st

R
Robinson’s answer to Berkeley’s logical criticism127 is to define the
derivative as
st
(
∆y
∆x
)
,
instead of ∆y/∆x as in Leibniz. “However, this is a small price to pay
for the removal of an inconsistency” [148, p 266].
We illustrate the construction by means of an infinite-resolution mi-
croscope in Figure A.2.
Note that both the term “hyper-real field”, and an ultrapower con-
struction thereof, are due to E. Hewitt in 1948, see [99, p. 74]. The
transfer principle allowing one to extend every first-order real state-
ment to the hyperreals, is due to J.  Los´ in 1955, see [127]. Thus, the
Hewitt- Los´ framework allows one to work in a B-continuum satisfying
the transfer principle. To elaborate on the ultrapower construction of
127See footnote 83.
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Figure A.2. Zooming in on infinitesimal ǫ
the hyperreals, let QN denote the space of sequences of rational num-
bers. Let
(
QN
)
C
denote the subspace consisting of Cauchy sequences.
The reals are by definition the quotient field
R :=
(
QN
)
C
/Fnull,
where the ideal Fnull contains all the null sequences. Meanwhile, an
infinitesimal-enriched field extension of Q may be obtained by forming
the quotient
QN
/Fu,
See Figure A.3. Here a sequence 〈un〉 is in Fu if and only if the set
{n ∈ N : un = 0}
is a member of a fixed ultrafilter.128 To give an example, the se-
quence
〈
(−1)n
n
〉
represents a nonzero infinitesimal, whose sign depends
on whether or not the set 2N is a member of the ultrafilter. To obtain
a full hyperreal field, we replace Q by R in the construction, and form
a similar quotient
IIR := RN
/Fu.
A more detailed discussion of the ultrapower construction can be
found in M. Davis [54], Gordon et al. [83], and Giordano and Katz
[79]. See also B laszczyk [29] for some philosophical implications. More
advanced properties of the hyperreals such as saturation were proved
128An ultrafilter on N can be thought of as a way of making a systematic choice,
between each pair of complementary infinite subsets of N, so as to prescribe which
one is “dominant” and which one is “negligible”. Such choices have to be made
in a coherent manner, e.g., if a subset A ⊂ N is negligible then any subset of A
is negligible, as well. The existence of ultrafilters was proved by Tarski [176], see
Keisler [118, Theorem 2.2].
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(
QN
/Fu)<∞   //
st


IIR<∞
st


Q //
)
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Figure A.3. An intermediate field QN
/Fu is built directly
out of Q
later, see Keisler [117] for a historical outline. A helpful “semicolon”
notation for presenting an extended decimal expansion of a hyperreal
was described by A. H. Lightstone [126]. A discussion of infinitesimal
optics is in K. Stroyan [168], H. J. Keisler [116], D. Tall [172], and
L. Magnani and R. Dossena [129, 58]. P. Ehrlich recently constructed
an isomorphism of maximal surreals and hyperreals [62]. Applications
of the B-continuum range from aid in teaching calculus [64, 109, 110,
173, 175] to the Bolzmann equation (see L. Arkeryd [4, 5]); modeling of
timed systems in computer science (see H. Rust [156]); mathematical
economics (see Anderson [3]); mathematical physics (see Albeverio et
al. [1]); etc.
In 1990, Hewitt reminisced about his
efforts to understand the ring of all real-valued con-
tinuous [not necessarily bounded] functions on a com-
pletely regular T0-space. I was guided in part by a ca-
sual remark made by Gel’fand and Kolmogorov (Dok-
lady Akad. Nauk SSSR 22 [1939], 11-15). Along the
way I found a novel class of real-closed fields that super-
ficially resemble the real number field and have since be-
come the building blocks for nonstandard analysis. I had
no luck in talking to Artin about these hyperreal fields,
though he had done interesting work on real-closed fields
in the 1920s. (My published “proof” that hyperreal
fields are real-closed is false: John Isbell earned my grat-
itude by giving a correct proof some years later.) [. . . ]
My ultra-filters also struck no responsive chords. Only
Irving Kaplansky seemed to think my ideas had merit.
My first paper on the subject was published only in 1948
[100]
(Hewitt goes on to detail the eventual success and influence of his 1948
text). Here Hewitt is referring to Isbell’s 1954 paper [105], proving
that Hewitt’s hyper-real fields are real closed. Note that a year later,
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 Los´ [127] proved the general transfer principle for such fields, implying
in particular the property of being real closed, the latter being first-
order.
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